An analysis of the Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) model by Kemper, Vernon P.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1993-12
An analysis of the Cost of Base Realignment Actions
(COBRA) model
Kemper, Vernon P.
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/39702







AN ANALYSIS OF THE





Thesis Advisor: Professor Lawrence R. Jones
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
94-06757
V4 "
Security Clmasification of this page
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE
Is Report Security Classification: Unclassified It Restrictive Markings
2& Security Classification Authority 3 Distribution/Availability of Report
2b Daclasificatiom/Downgrading Schedule Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
4 Performing Organization Report Number(s) 5 Monitoring Organization Report Number(s)
6. Name of Performing Organization 6b Office Symbol 7a Name of Monitoring Organization
Naval Postgraduate School (if aplicable) 36 Naval Postgraduate School
6c Address (city, stae, and ZIP code) T7 Address (city, state, and ZIP code)
Monterey CA 93943-5000 Monterey CA 93943-5000
8a Name of Funding/Sponsoring Organization 6b Office Symbol 9 Procurement Instrument Identification Number16•f -ph-b)
Address (city, state, and ZIP code) I0 Source of Funding Numbers
______________________ 
_________Program Element No IProject No ITask No 7Work Unit Accession No
11 Title (include security classification) AN ANt, .'SIS OF THE COST OF BASE REAUGNMENT ACTIONS (COBRA) MODEL
12 Personal Author(s) Kemper, Vernon P.
13a Type of Report 13b Time Covered 14 Date of Report (year, month, day) 15 Page Count
Master's Thesis From To December 1993 154
16 Supplementary Notation The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position
of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
17 Cosati Codes 18 Subject Terms (continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
Field Group ISubgroup Cost of Base Realignment Actions Model, COBRA, Base Closures, Cost Estimating
19 Abstract (continue on reverse if necessary and idenfy by block number)
As the result of the deliberations of the 1993 Base Realignment and Closv-e Commission, the Department of Defense will
close or realign over 100 military installations at a cost of over $5.5 billion. The Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA)
model is the primary financial analysis tool used by the Base Realignment and Closure Commission and the military departments to
evaluate the costs and benefits of proposed base closures and realignments. This thesis examines three critical aspects of the
model: the estimation of military construction costs, the prediction of overhead savings, and the choice of discount rate. COBRA
cost estimates are compared to actual military construction costs for three Navy bases selected for closure/realignment in 1988:
Naval Station, Brooklyn; Naval Station, Sand Point; and Naval Station, Hunters Point. Cost estimating relationships for overhead
costs are developed for five categories of Navy/Marine Corps installations and compared to the COBRA models for overhead
costs. The discount rate used for COBRA net present value analyses is evaluated with respect to directives in Office of
Management and Budget Circular A-94. The final chapter draws conclusions on the accuracy of the COBRA model, identifies
changes that may be made to improve the model, and suggests ares that require additional research.
20 Distribution/Availability of Abstract 21 Abstract Security Classification
undcasified/unlimited same as report _ DTIC users Unclassified
22a Name of Responsible Individual 22b Telephone (include Area Code) c22 Office Symbol
Jones, Lawrence R. (408) 656-2482 L 54Jn
DD FORM 1473,84 MAR 83 APR edition may be used until exhausted security classification of this page
All other editions are obsolete Unclassified
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
An Analysis of the




Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.S., University of Missouri-Rolla
Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of







Professor l nce R. Jones, Thesis Advisor
Asst. Professor Natalie .Web, Associate Advisor
David R. Whipple, Chairman
Department of Administrative Sciences
ii
ABSTRACT
As the result of the deliberations of the 1993 Base Realignment and Closure Commission, the
Department of Defense will close or realign over 100 military installations, at a cost of over $5.5
billion. The Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) model is the primary financial analysis
tool used by the Base Realignment and Closure Commission and the military departments to evaluate
the costs and benefits of proposed base closures and realignments. This thesis examines three critical
aspects of the model: the estimation of military construction costs, the prediction of overhead
savings, and the choice of discount rate. COBRA cost estimates are compared to actual military
construction costs for three Navy bases selected for closure/realignment in 1988: Naval Station,
Brooklyn; Naval Station, Sand Point; and Naval Station, Hunters Point. Cost estimating relationships
for overhead costs are developed for five categories of Navy/Marine Corps installations and compared
to the COBRA models for overhead costs. The discount rate used for COBRA net present value
analyses is evaluated with respect to directives in Office of Management and Budget Circular A-94.
The final chapter draws conclusions on the accuracy of the COBRA model, identifies changes that
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The breakup of the Soviet Union and the chronic increase
in federal budget deficits have signalled a new era of lean
defense budgets. The U.S. military no longer faces the
primary threat that had defined its force structure and
justified its spending for the previous forty years. After
two decades of increasing annual budget deficits, the people
and government of the United States are eager to trim the
defense budget and shift the commitment of national resources
from national security purposes to other uses. For these
reasons, U.S. defense spending (as a percentage of gross
domestic product) in 1993 will dip to its lowest level since
the demobilization after World War II [Ref. 1].
As defense budgets become leaner and the U.S. military
downsizes to post Cold War force levels, the military base
structure must also be reduced. Reducing the base structure
to remove excess capacity allows the Department of Defense to
avoid the costs of operating excess bases, costs which can be
substantial. The President's Private Sector Survey on Cost
Control (commonly known as the Grace Commission) concluded in
1983 that even a ten percent reduction in the existing base
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structure could save the Department of Defense $2 billion per
year in operating costs. [Ref. 2]
Reducing the military base structure also reduces the
opportunity cost to the American public of operating military
bases. According to Professor Fred Thompson, who has given
expert testimony before the Armed Services Committees, these
opportunity costs, the "...sacrifice of any better or higher
uses to which these millions of acres of real estate could be
put..." (Ref. 3] are unquestionably large. He states:
If, for example, we could allocate the two million of
these acres with the highest market values to their best
alternative economic uses without harming the national
defense, we could reduce the opportunity cost of maintain-
ing the existing base structure by at least $35 billion
and perhaps by as much as $90 billion. (Ref. 4]
Unfortunately, even though federal officials agree that
large savings can be achieved by reducing the military base
structure, making decisions to close excess bases has been
difficult. Most research points out that the primary reason
for this is the parochial interests of the members of Con-
gress. According to Douglas Arnold, congressmen must
"...protect the military installations in their districts,
because local beneficiaries see such installations as semi-
permanent benefits ... adverse decisions may suggest incompe-
tence or lack of interest in their constituents."
[Ref. 5] Legislators were indeed effective at keeping
2
the installations in their districts from closing; from
19771 until the first Commission on Base Realignment and
Closure in 1988, not a single major base was closed.
(Ref. 6]
Realizing that conventional legislative procedures were
ineffective for base closure decisions, the Department of
Defense established the Commission on Base Realignment and
Closure (BRAC) on May 3, 1988. Congress gave the Commission
its official power later that year when it passed Public Law
100-526, the Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure
and Realignment Act. This law required the President and
Congress to accept all or none of the Commission's realignment
and closure recommendations. (Ref. 71
Since its formation in 1988, the Base Realignment and
Closure (BRAC) Commission has been asked to make difficult
decisions on the closure and realignment of military bases.
From the beginning, the charter of this Commission has been to
evaluate the military base closures proposed by the Secretary
of Defense and the military departments, and to select the
best candidates for closure based on specific criteria.
Evaluation of the estimated cost savings of each proposed
closure is a vital part of the process, since the overall
objective of base closure and realignment is to eliminate
I In 1977 Congress passed legislation that gave the Armed
Services Committees the power to review all military base closure
decisions, thus giving Congress the power to make all base
closure decisions.
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excess capacity and avoid future costs. The potential cost
savings are substantial: the 1988 BRAC estimated the 20-year
net present value of the savings from the first round of base
closures at $5.6 billion in 1988 dollars. [Ref. 81
To evaluate the potential costs and savings of the base
closure alternatives under consideration, the BRAC has
developed a cost estimating model that attempts to capture all
essential costs and savings associated with each alternative.
This model, the Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA)
model, was developed by the U. S. Air Force Cost Center in
conjunction with the Logistics Management Institute. The
model was used to produce all of the cost estimates for the
1988 Commission, which were reviewed by the Government
Accounting Office (GAO) for accuracy. The model was then
revised to accommodate some of GAO's concerns and adapted for
use by each of the military departments.
The COBRA model is designed to estimate the costs and
savings associated with a proposed base closure or realign-
ment, using data that are available to the military department
staffs without extensive field studies. Thus these data can
be used to compare the relative cost differences between
various base closure alternatives.
COBRA has been used by the military departments and the
BRAC to produce the cost estimates for the 1991 and 1993 base
closures and realignments. However, intense congressional
scrutiny of the actual costs of closing bases and savings
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achieved has raised questions as to its use as a decision
tool. [Ref. 9] Economists have questioned whether
significant costs such as environmental cleanup costs and
unemployment benefits should be included in the COBRA model.
Perhaps more significantly, the Government Accounting Office
continues to report substantial differences between the actual
savings due to base closures and the savings predicted using
the COBRA model. [Ref. 101
This thesis attempts to address these issues by comparing
the initial COBRA estimates with the actual costs and savings
data for Navy bases that have completed a major portion of the
closure process. The study empirically validates the
costs/savings estimates and points out discrepancies that may
be used to improve the model and its use as a decision-making
tool.
B. OBJECTIVE
The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the COBRA model
as an economic decision-making tool. It analyzes the model to
determine if it captures all significant Costs of base
closure/ 'alignment and if its economic assumptions are valid.
In addition, the actual cost and savings data for the Navy
installations which have already begun the closure process are
compared with initial COBRA estimates.
S
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research question is: Is the Cost of Base
Realignment Actions model a valid financial decision-making
tool?
Subsidiary research questions include the following:
"* What is the COBRA model and how does it function?
"* Is the COBRA model based on sound cost estimating princi-
ples?
"* What are the economic assumptions made by COBRA?
"* How well do these economic assumptions match actual
economic parameters and would change of these parameters
over the relevant range affect the rank ordering of the
base closure alternatives?
"* Are the cost estimates produced using the COBRA model
useful for predicting the actual costs/savings incurred
for bases that are being closed or realigned?
"* If the cost estimates produced using COBRA are not
accurate, is this discrepancy caused by deficiencies in
the model or problems with the economic assumptions and
data input?
"* What changes can be made to improve the accuracy of the
COBRA model and enhance its value as a decision-making
tool?
D. SCOPE
The main thrust of this study is to evaluate the COBRA
model as an economic decision-making tool. This is
accomplished by first examining the cost estimation literature
and comparing the methods used by COBRA with those derived
from the literature. Special attention is given to previous
analyses of the model by the Government Accounting Office
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(GAO) and the changes made to the model during its evolution
to the current form.
After assessing the model analytically, this study
compares the actual costs and savings data with the initial
COBRA estimates for the Navy installations which have already
completed most of the closure process. The sample size is
limited to those Navy bases designated for closure by the BRAC
in 1988 and 1991 for which a significant portion of the
closure costs and savings are known. The bases examined were:
1) Naval Station, Brooklyn, 2) Naval Station, Sand Point,
Washington, and 3) Naval Station, Hunters Point, California.
E. METHODOLOGY
The research was conducted in the deductive mode with the
intent of rejecting/not rejecting the following a priori
hypothesis:
The COBRA model produces cost estimates that lead to sound
financial decisions.
Analytical, expert opinion survey, -and archival research
methods were used.
A comprehensive search of the literature of cost estima-
tion and capital'budgeting preceded the analysis of the COBRA
model. Previous analyses of the model were reviewed; special
attention was given to previous analyses of the model per-
formed by GAO and to changes made to the model as a result of
GAO recommendations. Expert opinion data were gathered
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through interviews with the members of the Navy's Base
Structure Analysis Team and the analysts responsible for the
review of the budget performance for installations undergoing
the base closure process.
Finally, archival data were examined from the budget
performance documents of the sample Navy bases undergoing
closure and compared to the initial estimates produced using
COBRA.
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
This thesis is divided into six chapters, beginning with
this introduction. Chapter II describes the factors consid-
ered when closing a military base and preparing it for
disposal. These include the costs of preparing the bases that
will receive personnel and missions from the closing base as
well as the costs to relocate personnel and equipment.
Chapter III describes the cost-benefit analysis approach and
calculational methods of the COBRA cost model. Chapter IV
surveys the previous studies on the COBRA model and summarizes
the modifications made to the model during the period 1989-
1993. Chapter V analyzes the model in light of these studies
and compares actual cost/savings data with the original COBRA
estimates for the sample Navy bases. Chapter VI summarizes
the findings and draws conclusions on the usefulness and
accuracy of the COBRA model.
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II. BASE CLOSURE COSTS AND SAVINGS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides a framework for identifying all of
the costs and savings associated with base closures. It
categorizes the costs and savings to DOD and the federal
government using the Congressional Budget Office guidelines
for analysis of base closure costs in Department of Defense
Reports [Ref. 11].
The chapter is divided into ten sections, including this
Introduction. Section B provides an overview of the magnitude
of the costs and savings due to closing bases. It introduces
the concepts of one-time and recurring costs/savings.
Sections C through J provide descriptions of the specific
categories of costs and savings using the CBO guidelines
mentioned above. The final section (K) summarizes the
chapter.
B. OVERVIEW
"It takes money to make money," and "there is no such
thing as a free lunch," are frequently quoted business adages.
Although they perhaps oversimplify, these phrases capture
succinctly the fundamental concept of closing military bases.
A relatively large one-time investment is required to close a
base before future savings can be achieved. The BRAC
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Commission estimated the total one-time implementation costs
for the 1988 round of base closures at $3.1 billion
[Ref. 12).
Lest these huge one-time costs deter the Department of
Defense from closing bases, Congress established the Base
Closure Account to provide the initial investment. The Base
Closure Account provides funds for military construction,
relocation expenses, environmental cleanup costs and other
one-time costs that are incurred as a result of base closure.
The decision to appropriate funds specifically for base
closures appears prudent, since the military departments were
reluctant to use funds from already lean Operations and
Maintenance and Military Construction Appropriations to pay
the costs of closing bases. Providing separate funds
earmarked for base closure forced financial decisions and sped
up the process so that savings could be achieved sooner.
Although the DOD incurs many different types of costs when
it closes bases, a small number of these types account for the
vast majority of the total dollar amount. Military
construction and environmental cleanup costs are the two
largest one-time base closure costs, accounting for over two-
thirds of the total. Figure 1 illustrates the relative
magnitudes of these costs. 2  The Operations category of
Figure 1 includes several types of costs: severance pay and
2 Figure 1 was created using data from the 1993 DOD Budget
justification for BRAC-I (the 1988 round of closures).
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early retirement pays for civilian employees, relocation
costs, etc.
One-Time Costs of Base Closure
Other (2.5%)
Homeowners Assistance (1.0%)




Figure 1 One-Time Costs of Base Closure for BRAC-I
The sizable future savings that can be achieved by closing
bases justifies these substantial one time costs: The GAO
conservatively estimates that the 1988 base closures will save
the Defense Department $453 million annually.
(Ref. 13] These recurring savings occur because the
number of civilian and military positions (and thus payroll
costs) and non-payroll overhead costs (such as utilities and
maintenance) are reduced.
As is the case with one-time costs, a few categories
account for the.vast majority of the total dollar amount of
the recurring savings. Figure 2 illustrates the relative
magnitudes of the recurring savings from BRAC-II (the 1991
11
round of closures). Military and civilian payroll savings and
overhead savings account for over 95 percent of the recurring
savings.3
Recurring Savings From Base Closures




Figure 2 Recurring Savings from BRAC-II.
Not all of the savings from base closures recur annually;
some are "one-time" savings. "One-time" savings occur
whenever one time costs that would occur if a base remained
open are avoided; for example, cancelling a programmed
military construction project at a closing base saves MILCON
funds. Throughout this chapter savings are considered true
savings if they represent dollars eliminated from the DOD
Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP).
3 The source of the data for Figure 2 was the 1993 DOD
Budget justification for BRAC-II.
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C. MILITARY CONSTRUCTION COSTS AND SAVINGS
Military construction costs comprise a large share of the
one time costs associated with base closures, accounting for
over $1.5 billion for the 1988 round of base closures
(Ref. 14]. Military construction may be required
when closing a base because before a base can be closed, its
personnel, equipment, and other mission essentials must be
transferred to a receiving base where the mission will be
continued. If the receiving base does not have excess
building capacity in suitable condition to support the
personnel and equipment, then a military construction project
is funded. If excess capacity exists, but in unsuitable
condition, then. military construction funds are used to
rehabilitate the facility. The funds spent for new
construction or rehabilitation are considered a cost of base
closure because they would not be spent if the base were not
closed.
Alternatively, closing a base may result in saving
military construction funds. When a base is chosen for
closure, the military construction projects programmed for the
base may no longer be needed and thus may be cancelled. The
funds that are not spent, net of any excess cost to terminate
contracts, represent savings to the Department of Defense.
These savings are attributed to the base closure action
because the funds would be spent if the base remained
operational.
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D. REAL ESTATE COSTS AND REVENUES
Once a military base is closed and the land has been
restored to proper environmental standards, the real property
may be sold or leased to generate revenue. This revenue (net
of the costs to promote the sale) is applied to the Base
Closure Account and thus represents a one-time savings to the
Department of Defense. Early estimates of the land sales
proceeds for the twelve largest of the bases chosen for
closure in 1988 ranged from $1.0 to $1.35 billion
[Ref. 15].
Unfortunately, the large number of regulations governing
disposal of federal property and the continued slow pace of
environmental cleanup have made the proceeds from land sales
very uncertain. The Navy has yet to realize any land sales
revenue from base closures, and estimates for the total DOD
proceeds from land sales from 1988 base closures have been
revised downward from $2.3 to $1.1 billion [Ref. 16].
The Department of Defense has had to purchase land to
support some base closures. In these cases the receiving
bases did not have adequate land to support the personnel,
equipment and mission transferred from the closing base.
These purchases are a cost attributed to the base closure
process because they would not occur if the base were not
closed. These costs can be defined with much greater
certainty than the savings from land sales.
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E. PERSONNEL COSTS AND SAVINGS
The lion's share of the recurring savings from base
closures comes from the elimination of military and civilian
positions. This is to be expected, since civilian labor costs
account for approximately 60 percent of the total cost of
operating a military base. In fact, for the 1988 round of
closures, personnel reductions account for 84 percent of the
$381 million in recurring savings to the Air Force
[Ref. 173. Accurate prediction of the savings due to
personnel reductions is essential when estimating the total
savings a base closure will achieve.
When the DOD closes or realigns military bases, it
eliminates some or all of the civilian and military positions
at the affected bases. The disposition of the affected
employees determines the amount of personnel costs and savings
due to the closure action. The DOD may transfer civilians and
military members to a receiving base where the number of
positions is increased. In this case no savings are achieved
because the number of employees and therefore payroll costs
have not decreased.
Alternatively, the DOD may choose not to transfer civilian
employees to new or previously existing positions, removing
them from the federal payroll using a Reduction in Force
(RIF). It may place the affected civilian employees in
another federal lob as part of the Priority Placement System.
Some of the affected civilian employees may choose early
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retirement or resign from their positions. In these cases,
savings can be achieved if no new employees are hired to take
their places, in other words, if the positions are eliminated.
The savings are attributed to the base closure only if the
positions are eliminated directly by the closure action and
not by some other mandated reduction in the civilian work
force.
In a like manner, the DOD may produce recurring savings by
reducing the nuximber of military positions when it closes or
realigns bases. Again, the savings are attributed to base
closure only if the military positions are eliminated by the
base closure action. Savings that accrue when military
positions are eliminated to meet goals for planned military
force reductions, even if concurrent with base closings, do
not count as base closure savings.
Closing bases involves personnel-related costs as well as
savings. The Department of Defense does not enjoy a "free
lunch" when it eliminates civilian or military positions. If
the civilian employees or military members affected by base
closing choose early retirement, then the DOD must consider
the marginal cost of providing early retirement benefits as a
base closure cost. If DOD uses a Reduction in Force to
eliminate civilian positions, then the severance pay it gives
to fired employees is a base closure cost. The DOD may also
be required to reimburse state governments for the cost of
16
unemployment compensation paid to workers who lose their jobs
when a base closes.
F. BASE OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT COSTS AND SAVINGS
The base closure process generates other substantial
recurring savings by reducing the total overhead costs to
operate the military base structure. Military base operations
are supported by two separate funds, one for the maintenance
costs of real property and the other for non-payroll costs of
base operating support. When the DOD closes a base, it sheds
the costs to maintain the buildings and grounds and to provide
services to base personnel and tenant commands.
Alternatively, the bases that receive the mission and
personnel from the closing base will see their overhead costs
rise. Net savings will occur if the base support funds saved
at the closing base are greater than the increase in costs at
the receiving bases. This is usually the case when the
receiving base has excess capacity and economies of scale can
be achieved.
The Department of Defense incurs other costs if the base
is deactivated4 (instead of closed) or if the closing process
is protracted. In either of these cases, DOD pays caretakers
4 When a base is deactivated, the activities are transferred
to other bases and a caretaker force is left in place to provide
minimal maintenance and security. The lands are not disposed of
and the base can be reactivated if needed.
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to provide minimal maintenance for the grounds and buildings
until the properties are sold or reactivated.
G. RELOCATION COSTS
Relocation costs are a relatively smaller portion of the
one time costs of closing a base, but they are not
insignificant. Before a base can be closed, the equipment
(aircraft, vehicles, and tools) and personnel must be
transferred to receiving bases where the activities will be
continued. The DOD pays for the packing, unpacking, freight,
and setup of transferred eqri.ipment. It incurs additional
costs when transferring specialized equipment; for example,
sophisticated laboratory equipment may require special
handling and require expensive recalibration after transfer.
Relocating civilian and military personnel involves
different types of costs. The DOD pays the total permanent
change of station (PCS) costs for all civilian and military
personnel transferred during the closing process. However,
since military members receive PCS orders at regular intervals
regardless of base closings, the cost of the PCS moves that
would have normally occurred during the closure period should
be excluded from base closure costs.
The DOD may be responsible for other costs of transferring
civilian employees. The Housing Assistance Program provides
payments to transferring federal employees who stand to lose
significant sums upon sale of their homes because of depressed
18
housing prices. These payments are a cost of base closure
because they would not be made if the affected military base
remained operational.
H. ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP COSTS
The cost of environmental cleanup at closing bases
continues to skyrocket. The military department estimates of
the cleanup costs for the bases chosen in 1988 have climbed
from $510 to $859 million [Ref. 18]. Experience with
the 1988 closures shows that cost estimates increase
significantly (sometimes by a factor of ten) after the
detailed studies and ground tests are complete. Pease Air
Force Base is representative of this trend:
... the preliminary environmental cleanup estimate was $11
million. In fiscal year 1992, the Air Force increased the
estimated cleanup to over $63 million and to over $102
million in fiscal year 1993 when it had the benefit of
studies and tests that were not previously available. By
December 1992, the estimate had increased to over $114
million [Ref. 19].
If the trend continues, the cleanup costs for the 1991 and
1993 rounds, currently estimated at $2.7 billion, will become
monumental.
Since 1991 the Base Closure Account has provided the funds
for environmental restoration of closing bases; however, the
DOD and reviewing agencies have not considered these
restoration costs as "base closure costs" per se. The current
policy of the DOD is that environmental cleanup costs should
not be a factor in the base closure decision process; it
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excludes these costs from its net present value analyses. The
DOD believes environmental restoration costs are sunk costs
since public law requires DOD to clean up the bases whether or
not they are closed5 .
Although DOD is required to clean up bases regardless of
closure decisions, the enormous costs of cleanup may in the
short term "squeeze out" defense spending in other areas. GAO
predicts that environmental cleanup costs will have
"significant budgetary impact since pressure for rapid
conversion and teutilization of closed bases will not allow
these costs to be spread over many years." [Ref. 20)
The opportunities that DOD forgoes to redirect its funds to
accelerate environmental cleanup have some value or cost that
should be recognized as part of base closure decision. This
issue is addressed in more detail in Chapters IV and V.
I. HEALTH COSTS
When DOD closes medical facilities at a base, the retirees
and dependents who previously used these facilities and remain
in the area must use civilian health care facilities. This
increases the costs to the Civilian Health and Medical Plan of
the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) and to Medicare. However, if
medical facilities are expanded at a receiving base during the
5 The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980 (Public Law 96-510) and Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-499)
require DOD to restore contaminated sites.
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closure process, more retirees and dependents in that locale
may be able to receive care at DOD facilities. This reduces
CHAMPUS and Medicare costs to the federal government, and
reduces the net increase in health care costs due to base
closings.
J. ECONOMIC GRANTS
The federal government has provided substantial financial
assistance to the communities affected by base closures
[Ref. 21]. From 1966 through 1987, federal agencies
provided $963 million (in 1988 dollars) in assistance to
communities affected by base closure or realignment;
however, it is hard to estimate the amount of economic aid
that will be available in the future. When asked how much
funding they could provide to communities affected by the base
closures in 1988, agency heads stated that "substantially
smaller amounts" of funds were available [Ref. 22].
Although it may be difficult to estimate the amounts of these
grants, they are still a cost of base closure.
K. SURWARY
In summary, closing military bases requires a relatively
large one-time investment in order to achieve future savings.
Two categories of costs, military construction and
environmental cleanup costs, account for the majority of this
large initial investment; however, large potential recurring
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savings may justify the initial costs. As was the case with
the initial or one-time costs, a few categories account for
nearly all of the recurring savings. Military and civilian
salary savings and non-payroll overhead savings make up over
95 percent of the recurring savings. Thus the accurate
estimation of these few categories of costs and savings is
crucial if the DOD is to make sound financial decisions as it
closes bases. The methods that the COBRA model uses to
estimate these costs and savings are the subject of the next
chapter.
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III. COST OF BASE REALIGMEINT ACTIONS MODEL
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter describes the cost-benefit analysis approach
and calculation. methods of the Cost of Base Realignment
Actions (COBRA) model. The chapter is divided into five
sections, including this Introduction. The second section
gives a brief history of the development and subsequent
modification of the COBRA model for use during the 1993 round
of base closures. The third section describes the cost-
benefit analysis methods used by the COBRA Model. It includes
a brief explanation of the net present value techniques of the
model and a definition of its key outputs. The fourth section
describes the COBRA algorithms for calculating the costs and
savings due to base closure actions. The final section
summarizes the chapter's findings.
B. DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODEL
The original Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA)
model was dev-1oped by the Air Force Cost Center, in
conjunction witi the Logistics Management Institute (LMI), to
evaluate the costs of Air Force stationing actions. Realizing
the basic model had more general applications, the first Base
Realignment And Closure Commission adopted the model to
evaluate the relative costs of its base closing and
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realignment decisions. The Commission revised the model so it
could be applied to all the Services, and used it to produce
the cost and savings estimates for all of its
recommendations.[Ref. 23]
The General Accounting Office (GAO) and the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) reviewed the model subsequent to the 1988
Commission's Report and found the "Cost of Base Realignment
Actions model used by the Commission and the services is a
conceptually sound tool for evaluating costs, savings, and
payback periods."[Ref. 24] However, the GAO also
found some errors in the model and provided the DOD with a
list of recommended improvements to add to the model prior to
the 1991 round of base closures.
The Department of the Army was given responsibility for
the modification of COBRA. The Army tasked Richardson and
Kirmse (R & K) Engineering to examine the model and provide
recommendations for improvement. The most significant of
these recommendations was to convert the COBRA model from its
original Lotus 1-2-3 spreadsheet format to a true computer
model using the PASCAL language. R & K subsequently converted
COBRA to PASCAL for the 1991 Commission, and the Secretary of
Defense directed the services to use the new standardized
model for all future base closure and realignment
recommendations.[Ref. 25]
The GAO and CBO examined the model subsequent to the 1991
Commission (as they had after the 1988 Commission) and again
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found the model conceptually sound but in need of minor
improvements. Prior to the 1993 Commission, representatives
from all of the Services and the Office of the Secretary of
Defense participated in working groups that addressed the
model's weaknesses and proposed several changes. R & K
incorporated thdse changes into the latest version of COBRA
(version 4.04) used by the 1993 Commission.[Ref. 26]
C. COST-BINUFIT ANALYSIS
The COBRA model is a cost-benefit analysis tool that
allows evaluation of base closure alternatives based on the
net present value (NPV) of the proposed scenario. The net
present value concept is a widely accepted means of evaluating
the worth of alternative programs; industry routinely relies
on net present value analysis when making capital budgeting
decisions and economists have often used the concept to
evaluate government policy alternatives. The Office of
Management and Budget (0MB), which sets guidelines for all
executive agencies, has declared that net present value shall
be "the standard criterion for deciding whether a government
program can be justified on economic principles."
[Ref. 27]
The chief advantage of the net present value approach is
that it recognizes the time value of money when analyzing the
costs and benefits of alternative programs. A base closing
decision that saves one dollar immediately is preferable to
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one that saves one dollar a year later. The dollar saved
immediately can be invested and earn a return f or a year,
accumulating greater value. The dollar saved immediately is
thus worth more than the single dollar saved at year's end.
The COBRA model converts all base closure costs and
savings into their worth at the present time, allowing valid
comparisons between alternatives whose costs and savings may
occur at different dates in the future. The COBRA User's
Manual describes the process as follows:
COBRA calculates the costs and savings of base
closure/realignment scenarios over a period of 20 years,
or longer if necessary. It models all activities (moves,
construction; procurement, sales, closures) as taking
place during the first six years, and thereafter all costs
and savings are treated as steady state. The key output
value produced is the Payback Period or Return on
Investment Year. This is the point in time where savings
generated equal (and then exceed) costs incurred. In
other words, this is the point when the
realignment/closure has paid for itself and net savings
start to accrue. [Ref. 28]
Figure 4 illustrates the net discounted savings/costs for
a typical base closure scenario with large one-time costs and
savings spread out over future years. The closure action is
assumed complete (all of the one-time costs and savings have
occurred) within the first six years6. During this period
the sum total of the discounted costs are greater than the
discounted savings. However, as steady state savings accrue
6 Public Law 100-526, the Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Act of 1988, prescribed that all closures and
realignments recommended by the Commission in 1989 shall be
completed by the end of fiscal year 1995.
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in the following years, the sum total of the discounted
savings exceeds the total discounted costs and payback is
achieved. (The figure's y-axis is defined in terms of costs,
therefore net savings will have a negative value.)
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Figure 3 Payback Period for a Typical Base Closure
In addition to the net present value criteria, COBRA
compares base closure alternatives in terms of how soon Return
on Investment, or Payback, is achieved. For alternatives with
similar net present values, the alternative with a shorter
payback period might be preferable since the savings are less
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dependent on the long-term validity of the discount and
inflation rates.used in the analysis.
D. CALCULATION METHODS
The COBRA model uses a "standardized" approach to
calculate the costs and savings of different base closure
scenarios. This approach makes COBRA useful for comparing
multiple complex basing scenarios without the need for
extensive data collection efforts at each installation.
However, this approach also limits the model's applicability;
a "standardized" approach can not possibly account for all the
possible costs and savings for the entire spectrum of DOD
installations. [Ref. 29]
The COBRA standardized calculation methods require three
types of data: standard factor, site-specific, and scenario-
specific data. Standard factors are service-wide estimates
for values common to nearly all installations. They include
the average officer salary, average enlisted salary, average
cost per square foot for different types of military
construction, and average cost per ton-mile for freight.
These estimates are obtained from historical data, published
pay tables, or cost estimating relationships already in use.
Site-specific data are "snapshots" of a particular
installation. They include the number of personnel, square
footage of facilities, overhead budget, and housing data. The
scenario-specific data are determined by the specific
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alternative under consideration. They include the number of
personnel relocating or being eliminated, the facilities to be
shut down, and the military construction required at the
receiving bases. [Ref. 301
COBRA uses these three types of data to calculate the one-
time and recurring costs and savings of each base closure
alternative. The one-time costs/savings are to a large degree
determined by the scenario-specific data, while the recurring
costs/savings are the result of the differences between the
closing and gaining bases, such as overhead rates, housing
allowance levels, and the number of personnel required at the
gaining base. [Ref. 31]
The Logistics Management Institute, in its first report on
COBRA, describes the different calculations as follows:
COBRA makes two types of calculations based on these two
categories of costs and savings. One-time costs are
computed as standard charges for item-by-item actions; in
doing so, the model applies Service-wide standard costs
and factors to scenario-specific inputs. Recurring costs
and savings are computed by comparing the cost of
specific services at the gaining and losing bases and
predicting how much it would cost to perform the
transferred services at the gaining base.
[Ref. 32]
COBRA performs dozens of these calculations for each scenario
in an effort to capture every possible significant cost and
saving.
Although the model collects many different types of costs
and savings, a few categories are responsible for the lion's
share of the dollar amounts. Military construction and
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environmental cleanup costs dominate the one-time costs of
closing bases (see Figure 2 in Chapter II), while overhead and
civilian/military salaries savings make up virtually all of
the recurring savings (see Figure 3). Thus the accurate
calculation of the costs/savings in these categories is
crucial to the overall accuracy of the COBRA estimate.
COBRA uses the standard factor approach to estimate
military construction costs. During the call for scenario-
specific data, an estimate is made of the type and size (in
square feet) of buildings and facilities that will need to be
constructed at gaining bases. COBRA then estimates the cost
of the proposed facilities using standard cost factors for the
type of facility and regional cost factors that account for
construction price differences between regions. The model
allows this estimate to be overridden if a detailed
engineering cost estimate for the proposed construction
already exists.
The model also uses standard factors to calculate civilian
and military salaries savings. The site-specific data for the
closing base includes the current number of civilian
positions. COBRA uses standard factors for the normal
turnover rate and early retirements to calculate the number of
employees that will remain at the closing base. The model
then calculates the number of these remaining positions that
will be eliminated using a "RIF" factor, a standard factor
that describes the percentage of the remaining employees who
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will not be placed in other federal jobs. The number of
eliminated positions is multiplied by an average federal
worker salary to determine annual recurring savings. A
similar process is used to determine savings from eliminated
military billets. [Ref. 33]
The model uses an exponential cost function to estimate
recurring overhead savings. Overhead savings are separated
into two types, maintenance of real property (MRP) and other
base operating -support (OBOS). For maintenance of real
property (MRP), the overhead cost function takes the form:
Cost = a*Xb, where X is the number of square feet of
facilities and a and b are constants determined from
historical data. The same functional form is used for other
base operating support (OBOS); in this case the variable X is
the number of military and civilian employees. As in the
previous case, the constants a and b are determined from
historical data. 7 [Ref. 34]
E. SUMRRY
In sumnary, COBRA is a cost-benefit analysis tool that has
been used by the military and the Base Realignment and Closure
Commission to evaluate the economic value of base closure
decisions. The standardized approach of the model has allowed
7 The original version of COBRA used by the 1988 Commission
used a simple linear model for overhead costs because the
Services were not able to develop the data required to estimate
the constants a and b.
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the Commissions to analyze a large number of closure
scenarios, but perhaps at the cost of accuracy. This chapter
provided explanations of the model's net present value
approach and calculational methods that will serve as the
background for further analysis of the model.
The GAO, CBO, and several DOD agencies have reviewed COBRA
and have made recommendations that have resulted in
improvements and additions to the model. A survey of these
previous analyses is the subject of the next chapter.
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IV. PREVIOUS STUDIES OF COBRA
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter surveys the previous studies of the COBRA
model performed by the General Accounting Office (GAO), the
Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), and the Center for Naval
Analyses (CNA). The chapter is divided into five sections,
including this Introduction. Section B describes the
previous GAO studies of the model and summarizes the changes
made to the model as a result of GAO recommendations. Section
C discusses the IDA analysis of COBRA that resulted from a
review of the cost savings due to the realignment of naval
laboratories. Section D provides the results of the CNA
analysis of the model. The final section summarizes the key
findings of these studies.
B. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
The General Accounting Office has conducted most of the
previous studies of the COBRA model; and has analyzed the
model during or just after the deliberations of the three Base
Realignment and Closure Commissions. The GAO first studied
the model in 1989, in response to a request from the House and
Senate Armed Services Committees for an evaluation of the 1988
Commission's methodology and recommendations. GAO analyzed
the model again in 1991 and 1993 as part of the base closure
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selection process 8 . Each of these studies has produced a set
of recommended changes to the model, many of which were
implemented prior to the subsequent round of base closure
decisions.
In its 1989 study of the Commissions closure
recommendations, the GAO concluded that the COBRA model "is a
conceptually sound tool for evaluating costs, savings, and
payback periods." [Ref. 35] However, GAO also found
several deficiencies in the model. These deficiencies
included 1) the exclusion of some relevant costs, 2) the use
of improper discount and inflation rates, and 3) errors in the
data input. [Ref. 36]
The report identified several base closure costs that are
not funded from the DOD accounts but are nevertheless costs to
the government. The study gave as an example the increase in
Medicare costs that may occur when a military hospital is
closed and retirees that were formerly treated at the hospital
migrate to the Medicare system. The 1989 COBRA model did not
include Medicare costs (or any other non-DOD costs) because
they were not paid from DOD funds. The GAO considered these
costs relevant to base closure and stated "...that studies of
8 The 1990 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act
requires GAO to analyze the Defense Department's selection
process and methodology during each Base Closure and Realignment
Commission. Its reports have always included analyses of the
costs/savings estimates and the COBRA model.
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base closures should consider costs on a governmentwide
basis." [Ref. 37]
The report also identified costs funded from DOD accounts
that the DOD believes should not be considered in the COBRA
model. By far the largest of these are environmental cleanup
costs, which were estimated at $661 million (1989 dollars) for
the 1988 BRAC round [Ref. 381. The GAO reported that
DOD did not consider these costs to be a consequence of base
closure since it is responsible for cleanup of all bases
regardless of closure decisions. The GAO agreed with this
approach; however, it pointed out that the costs were
"substantial." [Ref. 39]
In addition, the report stated that the discount and
inflation rates used by the model were too conservative. It
proposed using a 9 percent discount rate and 4.4 percent
inflation rate (based on 1989 indexes) instead of the 10
percent discount rate and 3 percent inflation rate used by the
BRAC. The GAO noted that these factors had "little impact"
[Ref. 40] on individual base payback periods;
however, they do increase the net present value of the base
closure savings.
The GAO analysts found many data entry errors during their
review of the 1988 COBRA estimates. They gave as an example
the case of Norton Air Force Base. The Commission decided to
leave the family housing area at the base open, but the Air
Force application of the model assumed that the family housing
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would be closed. The analysts proposed that the insufficient
time allotted to the BRAC process contributed to data accuracy
problems, and that allowing sufficient time for the Commission
to oversee data gathering and analysis would improve the cost
estimates. [Ref.. 41]
The GAO analyzed the COBRA model again in 1991 as part of
its report to Congress on the DOD's base closure selection
process. This report identified some of the same issues
previously raised in 1989- -excluding Medicare cost increases,
choice of discount and inflation rates, and various data input
errors. The report reiterated the GAO belief that
environmental cleanup costs should be excluded from COBRA, but
noted that the large costs had significant budgetary effects.
It also pointed out several previously undiscovered problems
with the flexibility and the calculational methods of the
model. [Ref. 42]
The flexibility issue was raised because the military
departments experienced difficulties entering some specific
cost data. Air Force analysts provided detailed engineering
cost estimates for their military construction, but were
unable to enter these costs directly into the model. They
also provided detailed base-by-base estimates for CHAMPUS cost
increases, but again were unable to enter the data. The
analysts were forced to devise a "workaround" solution; they
developed artificial input data that forced COBRA to produce
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construction and CHAMPUS cost estimates to match their
detailed estimates. [Ref. 43]
The GAO also reported several problems with the model
algorithms for moving costs and the costs of operating family
housing. The 1991 model assigned the same costs for moving
military students as for PCS moves. This caused the one-time
costs for bases with student populations to be overstated.
Also, the model treated family housing operations costs as
fixed. The GAO analysts did not believe this was realistic;
they proposed that operating costs should decrease at a
closing base and increase at a receiving base when new housing
is built. (Ref. 44]
Af ter the 1991 BRAC round, representatives f rom the Of fice
of the Secretary of Defense and each of the military
departments formed a working group to address the weaknesses
of the model and make improvements to the model prior to the
1993 BRAC. As a result, the current version (vers. 4.04) of
COBRA was developed. [Ref. 45] The improvements to
the model are summarized in Table I [Ref. 46].
The GAO report on the 1993 base closure selection process
included an analysis of the revised COBRA (vers. 4.04) model.
The analysis found that many of the problems identified in
previous studies had been corrected; however, some issues,
such as the exclusion of Medicare costs, still remained. The
study also raised two new issues. The algorithms and
programming of the newest version have not been independently
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verified. In addition, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)
experienced significant problems when it tried to use the
model to calculate overhead savings from consolidations.
(Ref. 471
Table I IMPROVEMENTS TO THE COBRA COST MODEL
Weaknesses and iinitations 1993 cost model features
in 1988 and 1991
Formulas: user may alter. Users cannot alter formulas.
MILCON: Actual costs of Military construction costs
construction cannot be can be entered.
entered.
Data entry: Data entry Data entry format problems
format is limited and net are eliminated.
result is inaccurate data.
Health care costs: % of % of retirees eligible for
retirees liable for Medi- Medicare can be entered
care at each installation into the model for each
should be entered. installation analyzed.
Multibasing capability: Model allows 15 bases
Model needs an expanded to be included in the
capacity to include more scenario as losers,
losing and gaining bases. gainers, or both.
Family housing: Operations Model estimates family
cost of family housing not housing operation savings
fully considered. at losing bases and cost
increases at gaining
bases.
Land sales: Revenue from Analyses rarely include
land sales is difficult land sales.
to estimate.
Documentation: Model has Model is documented in a




In summary,. the previous GAO studies have led to
improvements in the model, but have not resolved all of the
significant issues. The exclusion of non-DOD costs such as
Medicare, the choice of discount and inflation rates, and the
budgetary effects of the huge cost of environmental cleanup
are still contentious issues.
C. INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES
In 1991, the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) analyzed
the COBRA model as part of a review of the costs and savings
due to DOD laboratory realignments. IDA reviewed the
methodology and the assumptions of the COBRA model and made
detailed investigations of the costs/savings estimates for a
selected set of the installations scheduled for consolidation.
The IDA analysts identified several limitations with the
model, but concluded that these limitations collectively were
not critical enough to alter significantly the COBRA cost and
savings estimates. [Ref. 48]
The IDA study noted four principal limitations of the
COBRA model:
First, documentation has not been updated since 1989 even
though there have been about 30 modifications to the model
since that time. Second, the data base that supports the
standard factors used in the model is very limited ....
Third, COBRA is not designed to handle simultaneous
realignment of multiple installations. Fourth, the COBRA
structure cannot be easily modified to accommodate facts
of life in lieu of standard factors; this leads to
workarounds that defeat the purpose of a standard model.
[Ref. 49]
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The IDA proposed that these limitations "should be corrected
to enhance model utility in future realignment and closure
reviews." (Ref. 501
Two of these issues have been completely resolved. The
documentation for the model has been improved since the IDA
study. R & K Engineering published a user's manual, an
algorithm manual, and a programmer's manual in time for use by
the 1993 BRAC. In addition, the COBRA model (vers. 4.04) has
been modified to allow up to 15 bases to be included in a
single base closure scenario (Ref. 51].
The development of a data base for the standard factors
used in the COBRA model is a much more complex issue. The IDA
study suggested that the absence of a data base for COBRA's
standard factors opens the model to criticism from opponents
of a realignment or closure. It goes further to propose that
a "...good supporting data base would allow cost analysts to
choose default factors based on particular economic and
geographic assumptions." [Ref. 52] Unfortunately, the
IDA study did not suggest how such a data base could be
developed or what the source of the data should be.
The concern with COBRA's ability to "accommodate facts of
life" [Ref. 53] was based on in-depth analysis of the
COBRA estimates for laboratory realignments. IDA gives several
examples of costs that COBRA did not accommodate, including
costs for moving and recalibrating special research equipment.
It also points out that COBRA could not accept detailed
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engineering cost estimates for lab construction and did not
allow the timing of the construction to be varied. Some of
these problems are solved by the newest version of COBRA
(vers. 4.04), that allows the user to enter a detailed
construction cost estimate which overrides the COBRA
construction algorithm. In addition, version 4.04 allows the
user to enter special costs (like equipment recalibration
costs) in a "unique one-time costs" data field.
D. CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSES
The Center for Naval Analyses conducted a quick review of
the COBRA model during the 1991 BRAC process in response to a
request from the Navy's Director of General Planning and
Programming. In its report, analysts from the CNA concluded
that, "Overall, the model should serve the purpose of
examining the net savings from consolidating bases."
[Ref. 54] However, they also pointed out several
deficiencies in the model that included: 1) treatment of
industrial activities, 2) exclusion of some relevant costs,
and 3) choice of discount factors [Ref. 55].
The CNA study proposed that the 1991 version of the model
was inadequate for estimating the costs and savings of
consolidating industrial activities such as shipyards and
aviation depots. It pointed out that the cost structure of
industrial activities is different from the "typical military
base" [Ref. 56] and therefore COBRA (which is based
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on cost elements from bases that are not industrial
activities) does not capture all of the significant
costs/savings of closing/realigning industrial activities.
The study discusses several of these costs and savings not
addressed in the model, including:
"* labor cost differentials associated with moving from high-
cost to low cost regions,
"* transportation and setup/calibration costs for specialized
production equipment,
"* costs/savings due to the effects on the supply pipeline
and logistics network, and
"* cost increases due to slowdowns in production during the
moving process. [Ref. 57]
Furthermore, the CNA analysts proposed that the COBRA
model excluded other significant costs/savings that are
relevant to nearly all base closures/realignments. They
stated that land sales proceeds should have been included in
the 1990 version of the model as they had been in the original
1988 version. They also suggested that the change in federal
contributions to school systems for support of dependent
school children .should be taken into account. Finally, they
proposed that unemployment compensation costs should be
included as a cost of closing bases. [Ref. 58]
The study also found, as had earlier GAO studies, that the
proper discount and inflation rates had not always been used.
Unlike the GAO studies, the CNA study did not propose a
specific discount and inflation rate that should have been
used. Rather it identified some cases where the OMB circular
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governing economic analyses had not been followed, stating
that the OMB guidance "appears to be the correct guide to
follow." [Ref. 59]
In its summary, the CNA pointed out that the Navy limited
its use of the COBRA model to a screening role. The Navy used
the model solely as a means to demonstrate that proposed
realignments and closures would save enough money to recoup
the up-front costs. CNA pointed out that COBRA could be used
as a preference decision tool to compare alternative
strategies. The model could be used to compare the NPV and
Payback Year of competing strategies "to identify the
alternative with the higher economic payoff."
[Ref. 60]
Changes made to the COBRA model for 1993 have addressed
some of these findings; however, many issues still remain.
The latest revision still does not include calculations of
costs and savings which are unique to industrial activities,
but the Navy still endeavors to include these in their
costs/savings estimates for base closures. (The Navy practice
is to calculate these costs/savings outside the model and then
include them in COBRA estimates by entering them in the
"unique" or "miscellaneous" costs/savings data fields
available in COBRA [Ref. 61]). The current version
of COBRA includes unemployment compensation costs; however,
the proceeds from land sales and federal contributions to
schools were not considered during the 1993 BRAC.
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N. SOULO&RY
The previous studies of the COBRA model have led to
significant improvements to the model; however, some important
issues remain unresolved. The latest GAO study pointed out
that the model still excludes some relevant non-DOD costs.
The IDA study expressed concern for the validity of the COBRA
standard factor data base. The CNA report documented the
limitations of .the model when it is used for industrial
activities, limitations which still exist. Furthermore, CNA
and the GAO both questioned the discount and inflation rates
used in the model. These and other unresolved issues are
discussed in detail in the next chapter.
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V. DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents an analysis of three critical
aspects of the COBRA model: military construction cost
estimates, prediction of overhead savings, and the choice of
discount rate. The chapter is divided into five sections,
including this introduction. Section B compares the actual
military construction costs with COBRA estimates for three
Navy installations recommended for closure by the first Base
Realignment and Closure Commission. Section C analyzes the
methods used by the COBRA model to calculate recurring
overhead savings from base closures. Section D evaluates the
discount rate used for the COBRA net present value analysis in
light of Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance for
benefit-cost analyses. Section E summarizes the key findings.
B. MILITARY CONSTRUCTION: ESTIMATES VERSUS ACTUAL COSTS
As stated in Chapter II, military construction costs are
the largest component of the one-time costs of closing bases.
Thus, accurate estimates of the construction costs are
critical to the economic analysis of base closure decisions.
The Institute for Defense Analyses study of laboratory
realignments compared COBRA estimates of laboratory
construction costs with the current plant value of similar
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facilities [Ref. 62]. Previous GAO studies tested
the sensitivity of COBRA net present value analysis to large
changes in construction costs (Ref. 63]. However, no
previous study has compared COBRA estimates with the actual
construction costs for base closures.
Figure 4 presents a comparison of the COBRA cost estimates
with the budgeted military construction costs for three base
closings that are essentially complete. The sample bases are:
Naval Station, Brooklyn; Naval Station, Sand Point; and Naval
Station, Hunterd Point. They represent all of the Navy bases
selected for closure/realignment during BRAC I for which
nearly all the construction costs are known9 . The
construction costs and the COBRA estimates were converted to
1989 dollars for comparison. The budgeted costs for fiscal
years 1990 through 1993 and the COBRA estimates are presented
in Appendix A.
The base closures in the sample involved many different
types of military construction projects. The closure of
Hunters Point required the modification and improvement of
several piers at the Pearl Harbor and San Diego Naval
9 A portion of the military construction contracts
originally required to support the closure of Naval Station
Brooklyn have not been awarded. These contracts were for
recreation facilities, a police station, a bachelor officers
quarters, and storage facilities to be built at the Staten Island
Naval Station. When the 1993 BRAC decided to close Staten
Island, these projects were no longer required. The budget
estimates of construction costs were used for these projects
since the actual costs were not available.
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Figure 4 Comparison of COBRA Estimates with Actual
Costs of Military Construction f or BRAC I.
Stations. Tije realignment of Sand Point required
construction of a headquarters/administration building, a
commissary/exchange, a bachelor officers quarters, and several
recreational buildings at the Everett, Washington Naval
Station. The closure of Brooklyn called for construction of
"a public works center, a headquarters /administration building,
"a ba±chelor enlisted quarters, and a physical fitness center at
the Staten Island Naval Station.
The COBRA estimates are all within the expected range for
a parametric cost-estimating technique [Ref. 641.
The COBRA estimate for Brooklyn was $36.33 million, or 11.8
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percent below the actual construction cost of $41.2 million.
The estimate for Hunters Point was $80.37 million, or 12.9
percent above the actual construction cost of $71.16 million.
The estimate for Sand Point was $79.13 million, or 1.3 percent
above the actual cost of $78.08 million.
It should be noted that these are macroscopic comparisons
of the total construction costs for each closure/realignment.
This study was unable to verify that each of the finished
construction projects matched exactly the specifications
(square footage). used to derive the original COBRA estimates,
because the detailed COBRA construction estimates from BRAC-I
were not available. Although this study did not find any
evidence to support it, the possibility exists that the scope
of the construction projects may have been altered to keep
MILCON spending within budgetary goals based on the COBRA
estimates. However, interviews with officials at the Base
Closure/Realignment Branch of the Director, Shore Activities
(N44), who are responsible for the execution of the Base
Closure Budgets, provided evidence that this was probably not
the case. The Director (N444) stated that "... the budget
estimates for military construction were developed without
regard for the estimates provided by the COBRA model. COBRA
estimates do not determine our budgets." [Ref. 65]
The sample size is too small to draw statistically
significant conclusions about the accuracy of COBRA estimates
for military construction costs. However, it is noteworthy
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that the Navy COBRA model did not consistently under- or
overestimate the actual costs of military construction, a
small initial indication that the model does not produce
systematic estimating errors.
As noted earlier, several modifications have since been
made to improve the COBRA model, but it is noteworthy that the
military construction cost calculation methods used in the
1989 version of COBRA remain essentially unchanged in the
current version 4.04. The only difference between the 1989
and 1993 versions of the model are small changes in the values
of the standard factors used in the formulae. Military
construction standard factors for 1989 and 1993 are presented
in Appendix A for comparison.
However, the 1993 version of COBRA allows the user to
enter detailed engineering estimates of military construction
costs if they are available. This should improve COBRA net
present value analyses for the cases where detailed estimates
are available, since detailed construction estimates are
normally more accurate than estimates based on parametric
formulas.
C. CALCULATION OF OVERHEAD SAVINGS
Overhead savings comprise a significant portion of the
recurring savings achieved when closing bases, accounting for
approximately 25 percent of the total annual savings (See
Figure 2 in Chapter II). Thus, accurate estimation of
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overhead savings is critical to the economic analysis of any
base closure decision. This section analyzes the methods
used by COBRA to calculate overhead savings.
As stated in Chapter III, COBRA uses two exponential
functions to describe non-payroll overhead costs for all
installations. Maintenance of Real Property (MRP) costs are
predicted based on the square footage of the
buildings/structures on the installation. Other Base
Operating Support (OBOS) costs are predicted based on the
total personnel (military and civilian) assigned to the base.
The COBRA (version 4.04) algorithms' 0 for calculating non-
payroll MRP and OBOS costs are:
NewMRPCosts=OldMRPCosts*( NewBuil dingSF ui1ongFhI'a
OldBuildingSF
NewQBOSCosts=OdOBOSCosts*( Newpopula tion Dwinsex
01 dpopul a ti on
The recurring non-payroll overhead savings for a base closure
scenario are estimated in the following manner. The non-
payroll overhead costs prior to the closure action are summed
for all bases involved in the scenario. The non-payroll costs
that these bases will incur after the closure action are then
10 Algorithms are the set of formulas used in the computer
model to calculate costs and savings. The RPMA Building SF Index
and the BOS Index are entered as service-specific standard
factors in the COBRA model. RPMA stands for Real Property
Maintenance Activities and is equivalent to the Maintenance of
Real Property (MRP) term used by the Navy. BOS stands for Base
Operating Support and is equivalent to the Other Base Operating
Support (OBOS) term used by the Navy.
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predicted using the formulas above. The difference between
the pre-closure overhead costs and the post-closure overhead
costs represent the recurring overhead savings from a base
closure action.
The Navy Base Structure Analysis Team (BSAT) estimated the
values of the two constants, the RPMA Building SF Index and
the BOS Index, by applying regression analysis to the MRP and
OBOS costs for over 200 Navy installations in the U.S. and its
territories [Ref. 66]. Figure 5 presents the Navy
BSAT plot of MRP costs versus Building Square Footage for
these installations. Figure 6 presents the Navy BSAT plot of
OBOS costs versus Total Personnel. The data used by the Navy
BSAT are provided in Appendix B.
The RPMA Building SF Index was determined from a linear
regression of the logarithmic transform of the non-payroll MRP
costs on the single predictor variable, the logarithmic
transform of the buiLding square footage. The BOS Index was
determined from a linear regression of the logarithmic
transform of the non-payroll OBOS costs on the single
predictor variable, the logarithmic transform of the base
population (total military and civilian personnel assigned).
The analysis yielded an RPMA Building SF Index of 0.70 and a
BOS Index of 0.81; the Navy used these values when preparing
its COBRA estimates for the 1993 BRAC. The coefficient of
determination (R-squared) for the MRP regression was 42
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Figure 5 MRP Costs versus Building Square Footage
for Navy/Marine Corps Bases (Source: Navy
BSAT)
The COBRA method for estimating non-payroll overhead
savings relies on two key assumptions about the nature of
overhead costs at Navy/Marine Corps bases:
"* MRP costs are an exponential function of the square
footage of facilities for all installations.
"* OBOS costs are an exponential function of base population
for all installations.
Given the divers~e missions and the differences in size of the
many Navy and Marine Corps installations, one would reasonably
question the validity of these assumptions. The relationship
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Figure 6 OBOS versus Total Personnel for
Navy/Marine Corps Installations (Source:
Navy BSAT)
between MRP Costs and square footage at a naval hospital may
be different than the MRP-square footage relationship at a
naval air station because maintenance requirements for
hospital facilities differ from the maintenance requirements
for hangars and air-operations buildings. Furthermore, other
variables such as the age of the facilities, the severity of
the climate, or the type of buildings and structures may be
better predictors of MRP costs. The relationship between OBOS
costs and the total personnel assigned may also be different
for installations of various sizes and missions.
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To assess the effects of mission type on the overhead cost
relationships, this study analyzed the MRP and OBOS costs for
several categories of Navy/Marine Corps installations: naval
hospitals, air stations, naval stations, naval shipyards, and
communication facilities. The study found that the
relationships between MRP costs and building square footage
and between OBOS costs and total personnel vary significantly
between the categories of installations. The results are
presented in Tables II and III. For some categories, the
equations that best describe the overhead cost relationships
differ significantly from the equations used in the COBRA
model to calculate overhead costs. Thus it appears the COBRA
model may not accurately predict overhead savings from base
closures because it fails to take into account significant
differences in overhead costs relationships between categories
of installations.
Table II OBOS Cost Relationships for Navy/Marine Corps
Bases ($thousands)
Type of Installation Regression Model A4justed R-squared
Naval Hospitals OBOS =-1236+3.73TP 79.5%
Air Stations OBOS = 383 x TP- 59.1%
Communication Sites OBOS=4.66 x TI 75.5%
Naval Stations OBOS = 11138+.505TP 61.5%
Naval Shipyards OBOS = 7.17 x TP-' 39.0%
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The regression models in Table II are equations that best
describe the relationship between OBOS costs and the total
personnel (TP) assigned to the base. These equations were
developed by performing least squares regression analyses on
the OBOS costs to determine the best fit line for each set of
data. The adjusted R-squared1 1 value given for each equation
represents the percentage of the variation in the dependent
variable (OBOS) that is explained by the regression model. In
this regard, the closer the adjusted R-squared is to 100
percent, the better the regression model is for predicting
OBOS costs as a function of total personnel.
Two possible regression models were examined for each of
the five categories: a linear model and an exponential model.
The linear model was produced by performing least squares
regression of OBOS costs using total personnel as the
predictor variable. The exponential model was produced by
performing least squares regression on the logarithmic
transform of the OBOS costs using the logarithmic transform of
total personnel as the predictor variable. The adjusted R-
squared values for the two models were compared to determine
which model better described the reiationship between OBOS
costs and total personnel. The regression model which produced
the highest adjusted R-squared is presented in Table II.
11 The adjusted R-squared is used instead of R-squared
because the values are corrected for the sample size.
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Statistical-inferential procedures were performed to
assess the significance of the slope and intercept
coefficients of each regression model. The t-statistics12
(or t-ratios) were calculated for each coefficient term and
compared to critical values of the Student's t-distribution to
determine if the coefficient was useful for predicting
overhead costs. If the t-statistic was lower than the
critical value from the t-distribution for the 5 percent level
of significance, then the coefficient was considered
insignificant to the regression model. In general, the higher
the values of the t-statistic, the more useful a coefficient
is for predicting costs.
The regression models in Table III were similarly
produced. Regression analysis was performed on the MRP costs
using square footage (SF) of facilities as the predictor
variable to develop a linear model. An exponential model was
produced by performing regression of the logarithmic transform
of MRP costs using the logarithmic transform of square footage
as a predictor variable. The model that better explained the
MRP costs relationship, as measured by the adjusted R-squared,
is presented in Table III.
12 The t-stat ic is defined as the ratio of the





Table III MRP Cost Relationships for Navy/Marine Corps
Bases ($thousands)
Type of Installation Regression Model A4justed R-squared
Naval Hospitals MRP = 368 + .0037SF 82.9%
Air Stations MRP = 0.44 x SF' 7 ' 36.7%
Communication Sites MEP = .00155 x SV-' 91.8%
Naval Stations MRP=-1917+.00615SF 69.5%
Naval Shipyards MRP= 6125 +.0018SF 16.7%
For the types of installations for which overhead costs
vary linearly, the slope coefficient is critical for
estimating changes in overhead costs when personnel or
buildings are added or subtracted. The value of the slope
represents the expected change in overhead cost (MRP or OBOS)
for each unit increase in the predictor variable (square
footage or total personnel). It is noteworthy that the slope
coefficient for OBOS costs is much smaller for naval stations
than for naval hospitals (Table I). This implies that
addition of personnel to naval stations results in smaller
increases in overhead costs than for hospitals.
For the types of installations for which overhead costs
vary exponentially, the exponent of the predictor variable
term is critical. The exponent of the predictor variable
represents the percentage change in overhead costs (MRP or
OBOS) for a unit increase in the predictor variable (square
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footage or total personnel). For example, if the exponent of
the total personnel term (TP) is 0.80, then a ten percent
increase in personnel would cause OBOS costs to increase by 8
percent. It is noteworthy that the exponent for air stations
OBOS costs (.427) is much smaller than for communication sites
(.949). This reflects that much larger economies of scale
exist for air stations than for communication sites.
The following subsections discuss the specifics of the
regression analyses conducted for each of the five categories
of installations. Appendix C provides a breakdown of non-
payroll overhead costs by category of installation and the
computer printout of the regression analyses.
1. NAVAL HOSPITALS
The sample consisted of 15 Navy hospitals with MRP
budgets ranging from $320 thousand to $16.7 million. The CBS
budgets ranged from $397 thousand to $23.8 million.
The regression results indicate that a strong positive
linear relationship exists between MRP costs and building
square footage. Linear regression of MRP costs was performed
using building square footage as the single predictor
variable. The resulting regression equation is:
MRP($ thousands) =368+O.00371*TotalSF
The coefficient of determination, or adjusted R-squared, for
the regression is 82.9 percent. The t-statistics for the
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intercept and slope coefficients are 0.62 and 8.30
respectively, indicating that the intercept is insignificant
when describing MRP costs. The regression curve is shown in
Figure 7.
Regression analysis shows that an exponential
relationship between MRP costs and square footage is less
supportable. A linear regression of the log transform of MRP
costs was performed using the log transform of building square
footage as the predictor variable. The resulting regression
equation is:
lnMRP($thousands)=-5.84+1.02*lnTotalSF
The adjusted R-squared for the log-log regression is 56.1
percent, significantly weaker than obtained for the linear
model. The t-statistics for the intercept and slope were 1.88
and 4.35.
It should be noted that the coefficient of the ln
Total SF term, 1.02, would be the RPMA Building SF Index for
the sample installations (in this case Navy hospitals).
Economies of scale are indicated when an installation's RPMA
Building Index is less than 1.0. For example, an installation
with an Index of 0.80 would experience only an 8 percent rise
in MRP costs for every 10 percent increase in building square
footage. A value of 1.02 indicates that significant economies
of scale (with regard to MRP costs as a function of building
square footage) do not exist for Navy hospitals.
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Figure 7 Relationship Between MRP Budget and
Building Square Footage fo. Navy Hospitals
The regression results indicate a strong positive
linear relationship between OBOS costs and total personnel at
naval hospitals. Linear regression of OBOS costs was
performed using total personnel as the single predictor
variable. The resulting regression equation is:
OBOS($ thousands) =-1236+3.73*TotalPersonnel
The adjusted R-squared is 79.5 percent. The t-statistics for
the intercept and slope are 1.09 and 7.43, indicating the
slope coefficient is more significant in the linear model. The
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Figure 8 Relationship Between OBOS Costs and Total
Personnel for Naval Hospitals
The possibility of an exponential relationship between
OBOS costs and total personnel was also explored. A linear
regression of the log transform of OBOS costs was performed
using the log transform of total personnel as the single
predictor variable. The resulting regression equation is:
1nOBOS($ thousands) =0.16+1.11*lnTotalPersonnel
The coefficient of determination is 76.5 percent, nearly as
high as for the linear function. The t-statistics for the
intercept and slope are 0.14 and 6.83, indicating the
intercept coefficient is not significant in the log-log model.
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The coefficient of the in total personnel term would
be the OBOS Index for Naval Hospitals. Since the value 1.11
is greater than 1, the data indicate that some diseconomies of
scale (with regard to OBOS costs as a function of personnel)
may exist for Navy hospitals.
2. COMMUUICATION FACILITIES
The sample consisted of seven Navy communications
facilities with MRP budgets ranging from $20 thousand to $1.7
million. The OBOS budgets ranged from $202 thousand to $8.4
million.
The regression results indicate the MRP costs at
communication sites may best be described as an exponential
function of building square footage. Linear regression of the
log transform of MRP costs was performed using the log
transform of building square footage as the single predictor
variable. The resulting regression equation is:
1nMRP($ thousands) =-6.47+1.04*lnTota1SF
The adjusted R-squared for this model is 91.8 percent,
indicating a strong correlation. The t-statistics for the
intercept and slope are 4.29 and 8.27, so it appears both
coefficients are significant. The regression curve is shown
in Figure 9. The coefficient of the in Total SF term (1.04)
indicates that economies of scale (with respect to MRP costs
as a function of building square footage) probably do not
exist for communication facilities.
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Linear regression of the MRP costs was performed using
building square footage as the single predictor. The resulting
regression equation is:
MRP($ thousands) =-15.2+.O0283TotalSF
The adjusted R-squared is 81.0 percent, slightly weaker than
the 91.8 percent obtained for the log-log regression. The t-
statistics for the intercept and slope coefficient are 0.09
and 5.15, indicating that the intercept is not significant.
NAVCOMSTA MRP
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Figure 9 Relationship Between MRP Budget and
Building Square Footage for Navy
Communication Sites
Regression analysis indicates that OBOS costs at
communication sites may best be described as an exponential
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function of the total personnel assigned to the site. The
regression of the log transform of OBOS costs using the log
transform of Total Personnel as the single predictor produces
the following regression equation:
lnOBOS($ thousands) =1.54+0.966*lnTotalPersonnel
The adjusted R-squared is 75.5 percent. The t-statistics for
the intercept and slope coefficients are 1.11 and 4.42. The
regression curve is shown in Figure 10. The coefficient of
the in Total Personnel term (10 966) is slightly less than 1.0,
indicating that very small economies of scale (with respect to
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Figure 10 Relationship Between OBOS Costs and Total
Personnel for Navy Communications Sites
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Regression analysis shows that a linear relationship
between OBOS costs and Total personnel is less supportable.
Linear regression of OBOS costs using total personnel as the
single predictor produces the following regression equation:
OBOS($thousands)=228+3.72*TotalPersonnel
The adjusted R-squared is 44.9 percent, weaker than the 75.5
percent obtained for the log-log regression. The t-statistics
for the intercept and slope are 0.16 and 2.43, indicating that
the intercept is not significant to the model. It is
noteworthy that the coefficient of total personnel (3.72) is
nearly the same as for the linear relationship describing OBOS
costs at naval hospitals (3.73).
3. NAVAL SHIPYARDS
The sample consists of seven naval shipyards with non-
payroll MRP budgets ranging from $3.35 to $26.7 million. The
non-payroll OBOS budgets ranged from $12.8 to $79.7 million.
The results of the regression analysis indicate a weak
linear correlation between MRP costs and the square footage of
the facilities. Linear regression of MRP costs using building
square footage as the single predictor variable produces the
following regression equation:
MRP($thousands)=6125+0.OO179TotalSF
The adjusted R-squared is 16.7 percent, indicating a weak
correlation between MRP and building square footage. The t-
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statistics for the intercept and slope coefficients are 0.96
and 1.48; neither coefficient can be accepted at the 5
percent significance level.
A linear regression of the log transform of MRP costs
using the log transform of the building square footage as the
predictor variable was also performed. The resulting
regression equation is:
lnMRP=-2 .65+0.791*inTotalSF
The R-squared is 16.2 percent comparable to the value obtained
for the linear model. The t-statistics for the intercept and
slope are 0.32 and 1.47. Figure 11 shows the log-log
regression curve. Unlike the case for naval hospitals and
communication sites, the coefficient of the ln Total SF term
(0.791) indicates that economies of scale (with regard to MRP
costs as a function of square footage) do exist for naval
shipyards.
The relatively small values of R-squared and the t-
statistics obtained for both the linear and the log-log
regressions indicate that neither the linear nor exponential
model are reliable for predicting MRP costs at shipyards.
Perhaps other variables (e.g., drydock capacity) should be
explored as possible predictors of MRP costs.
Regression analysis indicates an exponential model is
slightly preferable to a linear model for describing OBOS
costs at shipyards. A linear regression of the log transform
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Figure 11 Relationship Between MRP costs and
Building Square Footage for Navy Shipyards
of OBOS costs was performed using the log transform of Total
Personnel as the single predictor variable. The resulting
regression equation is:
InOBOS($thousands)=1.97+0.949*lnTotalPersonnel
The adjusted R-squared is 39.0 percent for the log-log
regression. The t-statistics for the intercept and slope are
0.51 and 2.20. The intercept coefficient is insignificant and
the slope coefficient can be accepted at the 10 percent
significance level. The coefficient of the in Total Personnel
term (0.949) is slightly less than 1.0; indicating that small
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Figure 12 Relationship Between OBOS Costs and Total
Personnel for Navy Shipyards
The existence of a linear correlation between OBOS
costs and the number of personnel assigned is less
supportable. The linear regression of OBOS costs using total
personnel as the single predictor variable results in the
following regression equation:
OBOS($ thousands) =12182+3.48*TotalPersonnel
The adjusted R-squared is 34.0 percent, slightly inferior to
the value for the log-log regression. The t-statistics for
the intercept and slope coefficients are 0.71 and 2.02.
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However, it is noteworthy that the coefficient of the Total
Personnel term (3.48) is close to the value obtained for the
linear models of OBOS costs at hospitals and communication
sites.
4. NAVY/XARINE CORPS AIR FACILITIES
The sample consisted of thirty-one Navy/Marine Corps
Air Stations with non-payroll MRP budgets ranging from $1.9 to
$44.9 million. Non-payroll OBOS budgets ranged from $4.1 to
$35.8 million.
The regression results indicate an exponential model
is preferable to a linear model for describing MRP costs as a
function of building square footage. Linear regression of the
log transform of the MRP costs using the log transform of
building square footage as the predictor variable yielded the
following regression equation:
lnMRP($thousands)=-O.82+0.677*lnTotalSF
The adjusted R-squared is 36.7 percent. The t-statistics for
the intercept and slope coefficients are 0.35 and 4.29,
indicating the .intercept is insignificant in the log-log
model. The regression curve is shown in Figure 13. The
coefficient of the ln Total SF term (0.677) is less than 1.0,
indicating that significant economies of scale (with respect
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Figure 13 Relationship Between MRP Costs and
Building Square Footage for Navy/MarineCorps Air Facilities
Regression analysis indicates that a linear
relationship between MRP costs and building square footage is
less supportable. Linear regression of MRP costs using
building square footage as the predictor variable yielded the
following regression equation:
MRP ($ thousands) =2424 +. 00325 * TotalSF
The adjusted R-squared is 32.8 percent, slightly inferior to
the value obtained for the log-log regression.
Regression analysis indicates that OBOS costs are best
described as an exponential function of the total personnel
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assigned. Linear regression of the log transform of the OBOS
costs using the log transform of total personnel as the
predictor variable yielded the following regression equation:
1nOBOS($thousands)=5.95+O,427*TotalPersonnel
The adjusted R-squared is 59.1 percent, indicating a
relatively strong correlation. The t-statistics for the
intercept and slope coefficients are 11.51 and 6.66. Thus, it
appears the intercept and slope coefficients are both
significant in this model. Figure 14 shows the regression
curve. The coefficient of the In Total Personnel term (0.427)
is significantly less than 1.0; indicating that significant
economies of scale (with respect to OBOS costs as a function
of total personnel) exist for Navy/Marine Corps air stations.
The case for a linear relationship between OBOS costs
and total personnel assigned is not as strong. Linear
regression of OBOS costs using total personnel assigned as the
predictor variable gives the following regression equation:
OBOS($ thousands) =9013+0.899TotalPersonnel
The adjusted R-squared is 51.5%, smaller than the coefficient
obtained for the log-log regression. It is noteworthy that
the coefficient of the Total Personnel term (0.899) is much
smaller than the coefficients obtained for the linear models
for OBOS at hospitals, communication sites and shipyards;
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Figure 14 Relationship Between OBOS Costs and Total
Personnel for Navy/Marine Corps Air
Vacilities
5. NAVAL STATIONS
The sample consists of a group of 9 naval stations
with non-payroll MRP budgets ranging from $1.75 to $18.2
million. Their non-payroll OBOS budgets ranged from $4.3 to
$44.4 million.
Regression analysis indicates that a linear model is
preferable to an exponential model for describing the
relationship between MRP costs and building square footage.
Linear regression of the MRP costs using building square
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footage as the predictor variable gives the following
regression equation:
MRP($ thousands) =-1917+0.00615*TotalSF
The adjusted R-squared is 69.5 percent; indicating a
relatively strong linear correlation between MRP costs and
building square footage. The t-statistics for the intercept
and slope coefficients are 0.60 and 4.39, indicating the
intercept term is not significant. The regression curve is
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Figure 15 Relationship Between MRP Costs and
Building Square Footage for Naval Stations
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The regression results indicate an exponential model
is not as supportable. Linear regression of the log transform
of MRP costs using the log transform of building square
footage as the predictor variable results in the following
regression equation:
1nMRP($thousands)=-9.42+1.28*lnTotalSF
The coefficient of determination is 39.9 percent;
significantly weaker than the 69.5 percent obtained for the
linear model. Note that if this exponential model were used
to describe MRP co..ts, the coefficient of the in Total SF term
(1.28) would indicate significant diseconomies of scale for
naval stations.
A linear model appears to be preferable to an
exponential model for describing the relationship between OBOS
costs and total personnel assigned at naval stations. Linear
regression of OBOS costs using total personnel as the
predictor variable yields the following regression equation:
OOS($thousands)=11138+O.505TotalPersonnel
The adjusted R-squared is 61.5 percent, indicating a
relatively strong linear correlation. The t-statistics for
the intercept and slope coefficients are 3.41 and 3.71, thus
both the intercept and slope are significant. The regression
curve is shown in Figure 16. The y-intercept (11138)
indicates that a large portion of the OBOS costs are fixed.
Furthermore, the coefficient of the Total Personnel term
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(0.505) is much smaller than for the linear models for OBOS
costs at hospitals, communication sites, and shipyards. The
lower cost per person reflects that the population of naval
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Figure 16 Relationship Between OBOS Costs and Total
Personnel for Naval Stations
An exponential model for OBOS costs was also explored.
Linear regression of the log transform of the OBOS costs using
the log transform of total personnel as the predictor variable
gives the following regression equation:
InOBOS($thousands)=6.74+0.327*lnTotalPersonnel
The adjusted R-squared is 31.2 percent; smaller than for the
linear model. The t-statistics for the intercept and slope
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coefficients are 4.85 and 2.15, indicating the intercept term
is more significant in the log-log model. Note that if this
model were used to describe OBOS costs, the coefficient of the
in Total Personnel term (0.327) would indicate that
significant economies of scale (with regard to OBOS costs as
a function of total personnel) exist for naval stations.
To summarize, it appears that the relationships
between MRP costs and building square footage and between OBOS
costs and total personnel vary significantly between
categories of installations. Direct comparison of the
overhead cost models for air stations and naval shipyards
illustrates this point. Non-payroll costs for air stations
are an exponential function of total personnel. The exponent
of the total personnel term is 0.427, indicating that for
every 10 yarcent increase in base population, OBOS costs would
be expected to increase 4.27 percent. Non-payroll OBOS costs
are an exponential function of base population for naval
shipyards also, but the exponent of the total personnel term
is 0.949, indicating that OBOS costs rise 9.49 percent for
every 10 percent increase in base population. It would seen
much greater economies of scale (with regard to OBOS costs)
are achieved at air stations.
As noted earlier, the COBRA model does not account for
variations in overhead cost relationships between categories
of installations when calculating the overhead savings from
base closures. 'This may lead to significant errors when
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calculating the overhead savings from a base closure. To
illustrate this point consider the closing of an air station
that relocates some 6000 personnel to a single receiving air
station with a current population of 12000 and non-payroll
OBOS costs of $20 million. Using the COBRA equation for OBOS
costs (BOS Index = 0.81), the predicted OBOS costs at the
receiving base would be:
$20million*( 18000 )**(.81)=$27.Smillion
12000
If the regression model developed specifically for air
stations is used (BOS Index = 0.427), the predicted OBOS costs
are:
$20million*( 18000)**(.427)=$23.8million12000
The difference in predicted OBOS costs is $4 million per year
or approximately 17 percent of the annual OBOS costs. In this
case, using the COBRA model will underestimate overhead
savings because the OBOS costs at the receiving base are
overestimated. Conversely, t.hxe COBRA model would tend to
overestimate overhead savings for those categories of
installations that do not experience significant economies of
scale (BOS Index >.81).
Furthermore, the strength of the correlation between
square footage and MRP costs and between base population and
OBOS costs varies considerably between categories. The
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adjusted R-squared for the regression model for MRP costs at
naval hospitals is 82.9 percent, indicating a strong
relationship between facilities square footage and MRP costs.
However, the adjusted R-squared for the MRP cost model at
naval shipyards is only 16.7 percent, indicating a very weak
or no relationship between square footage and MRP costs. This
indicates that other variables, such as the harshness of the
climate or the age of the facilities, may influence MRP costs.
Future studies may be able to improve the overhead cost models
by identifying variables that are better predictors of MRP and
OBOS costs.
D. CHOICE OF DISCOUNT RATE
The proper choice of the discount rate is crucial to any
net present value analysis like the COBRA model because "... an
incorrect discount rate could result in an incorrect
investment decision." [Ref. 68] The discount rate
must correctly reflect the opportunity cost of the funds
invested in the project. Choosing a rate that is higher than
the opportunity cost of obtaining funds causes the costs and
savings streams in the out-years to be discounted too heavily.
For a typical project requiring a large initial investment
with savings/benefits spread over subsequent years, the net
effect is to underestimate the net present value of the
project. Conversely, if the analysis uses a discount rate
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that is too low, the net present value of the project will be
overstated.
The discount rate used in COBRA is dictated by the
policies and guidance of the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) Circular Number A-94, "Guidelines and Discount Rates for
Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs." (Ref. 691
Circular A-94 provides guidance on benefit-cost analyses used
to evaluate federal programs, including guidance for choosing
a discount rate for use in net present value analyses. The
guidance must be followed "...in all analyses submitted to OMB
in support of legislative and budget programs."
[Ref. 70]
Circular A-94 provides guidance on the discount rates to
be used in analysis of federal programs based on the type of
costs and benefits associated with the program. For programs
and public investments that provide benefits and add costs to
the general public, the social discount rate is applicable.
The social discount rate represents the opportunity cost of
the consumption and investment possibilities foregone by
society when the public investment is made. A-94 specifies a
7 percent real discount rate 13 in this case because it
13 Real discount rates have been adjusted to eliminate the
effect of expected inflation. According to A-94, real discount
rates should be used when analyzing costs and savings that are
presented in constant-dollars. The real discount rate can be
estimated by subtracting expected inflation from nominal interest
rates.
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"approximates the marginal pretax rate of return on an average
investment in the private sector in recent years.'
(Ref. 71] OMB identifies another type of federal
program or investment that provides benefits or adds costs
solely to the federal government or agency. A-94 gives as an
example the case of investment in energy-efficient buildings
that reduce federal operating costs. These "internal"
(Ref. 72] investments do not displace societal
consumption and investment; however, they displace other
government programs or investments. Therefore, the discount
rate should reflect the opportunity cost of government
borrowing. A-94 states that "...it is appropriate to
calculate such a project's net present value using a
comparable-maturity Treasury rate14  as a discount rate."
(Ref. 731
Circular A-94 recognizes that some federal projects and
investments involve both "internal" government cost savings
and "external" social benefits and costs. A-94 recommends
using the 7 percent social discount rate in these cases,
unless the internal government savings can be analyzed
separately from the social benefits. If the two can be
separated, "Federal cost savings and their associated
14 The U.S. treasury rate varies daily. According to the
Merrill Lynch Bond Indexes, as of October 1, 1993, the Treasury
rate for maturities greater than 10 years had ranged from 6.02 to
7.73% over the previous 52 weeks. Note that these are nominal
rates.
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investment costs may be discounted at the Treasury rate, while
the external social benefits and their associated investment
costs should be discounted at the 7 percent real rate."
[Ref. 74]
The base closure process appears to be a federal
investment that involves both "internal" government costs and
savings and "external" social costs and benefits. The
categories of base closure costs described in Chapter II--
military construction costs, moving costs, military and
civilian salaries savings, etc. -- are all "internal" government
costs and savings. However, closing bases also has
significant costs and benefits for society as a whole. The
lost business activity that accompanies base closure is a
measurable cost to society. The return of the military land
to civilian uses may provide a measurable benefit to society.
The COBRA model uses a 7 percent real discount rate for
the net present value analysis of base closures. At first
glance, this would appear to be consistent with OMB Circular
A-94 guidance which recommends using the social discount rate
for investments that produce social benefits and costs that
are not separable from the internal government costs and
savings. A closer look at the COBRA net present value
analysis reveals flaws in this approach.
The COBRA model does not attempt to include societal
benefits and costs in its analysis of the base closure
process. Indeed, it is the policy of DOD to include only
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costs and savings directly traceable to DOD in the model net
present value analysis. The latest GAO analysis stated the
DOD position: "DOD believes its responsibility is to
determine whether its recommendations will result in savings
to DOD, without Consideration of the effects on other federal
agencies." [Ref. 75]
The costs and savings considered in the COBRA model--
military construction costs, overhead savings, military salary
savings, etc.--are internal to the government (or more
specifically DOD). The investment associated with these
internal costs and savings represent funds that cannot be used
by DOD for other projects. Therefore, the opportunity cost of
these funds is the rate at which the federal government can
borrow funds for DOD- -the Treasury rate. If the COBRA model is
limited solely to DOD-specific costs and savings, then the
comparable-maturity Treasury rate should be used as the
discount rate in the net present value analysis.
The DOD policy of limiting the COBRA analysis to DOD-
specific costs and savings appears contrary to the OMB
guidance for benefit-cost analyses. Concerning the
identification and measurement of benefits and costs, OMB
states "Social net benefits, and not the benefits and costs to
the Federal Government, should be the basis for evaluating
Government programs or policies that have effects on private
citizens or other levels of Government." [Ref. 76]
Based on this guidance, it may be argued that analysis of the
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base closure process should include estimates of the societal
costs and benefits--the costs of lost business, the benefits
of returning military land to productive civilian uses, etc.
The DOD policy may be prudent since it is difficult to
estimate the social costs and benefits of base closures given
the time constraints of the Base Realignment and Closure
Commission process. The effects of base closings on local
unemployment have been roughly estimated using models
developed by the Logistics Management Institute and the Office
of Economic Adjustment; however, these models do not assign
monetary values to the loss of jobs. [Ref. 77]
Estimates of the social benefits of returning closed bases to
civilian uses depend not only on the market value of the land
but also on type of enterprise, public or private, that
replaces military operations. Based on experiences with
previous closures, future use of closed bases is difficult to
predict [Ref. 78].
To summarize, the discount rate used for COBRA net present
value analyses should be based on the type (internal or
external) of costs and benefits considered in the model. The
current version of COBRA uses a 7 percent real discount rate
(the social discount rate) for net present value analyses. If
external social costs/benefits are considered, then the social
discount rate seems most appropriate. However, DOD policy is
to include only internal DOD costs and savings in the COBRA
analyses. The investment associated with these internal DOD
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costs and savings represents funds that cannot be used by DOD
for other projects. The opportunity cost of these funds is
the government borrowing rate, the Treasury rate. Therefore,
as long as COBRA analyses are limited to DOD costs and
savings, the Treasury rate would be a more appropriate
discount rate for the COBRA model.
E. SUMMARY
In summary, .this chapter examined three of the critical
aspects of the COBRA model. Military construction costs were
compared to the COBRA construction costs estimates for three
Navy bases involved in BRAC I, revealing that the COBRA
estimates for this limited sample are within the accuracy
expected for a parametric cost-estimating technique. The
exponential models used by COBRA to predict overhead cost
savings were examined and the relationships between MRP costs
and building square footage and between OBOS costs and base
population were analyzed for several categories of Navy
installations. The study concludes that the relationship
between overhead costs and predictor variables such as
building square footage vary significantly between categories
of installations. The differences appear large enough that
use of a single equation to describe either OBOS or MRP costs
may cause errors in the prediction of overhead savings from
base closures. Finally, the discount rate used in the COBRA
net present value analysis was evaluated in light of OMB
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Circular A-94 guidance, revealing that COBRA incorrectly
applies a social discount rate (vice the Treasury rate) to
costs and savings that are internal to DOD. The conclusions
that flow from these findings and possible areas for further
research are presented in the next chapter.
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter summarizes the findings of the thesis and
draws conclusions on the accuracy of the Cost of Base
Realignment Actions (COBRA) model. The chapter is divided
into six sections, including this Introduction. Section B
summarizes the study, reviewing the major points of each of
the previous chapters. Section C presents conclusions based
on the findings of the study. Military construction cost
estimates, methods for calculating overhead savings, and the
choice of discount rate are all analyzed. Section D
discusses the Navy use of the COBRA model during the 1993 BRAC
process. The budgetary implications of base closures are
examined in Section E. The final section (F) provides
suggestions for further research on the COBRA model and the
base closure process.
B. SUMMARY
Chapter I reviewed the changes in the political and fiscal
environments that led to formation of the Base Realignment and
Closure Commission. The Cost of Base Realignment Actions
model was developed to allow the Commission to analyze the
financial implications of proposed base closures.
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Chapter II described the costs and savings associated with
the closure of military bases. It was shown that closing
bases requires a large one-time investment, but that the
sizable predicted future savings justify this initial
investment. Military construction costs make up the largest
portion of the one-time costs of base closure. The predicted
future savings are made up primarily of savings from the
elimination of military and civilian positions and the
reduction of overhead expenses.
Chapter III described the cost-benefit analysis approach
and calculation methods of the model. The COBRA algorithms
for calculating key costs and savings, such as salary savings
and military construction costs, were provided. The cost-
benefit analysis method used by COBRA--the net present value
approach--was also explained. The key output variables of the
model were defined: payback period, net present value, and
return on investment year.
Chapter IV surveyed the previous studies of the COBRA
model performed by the General Accounting Office, the
Institute for Defense Analyses, and the Center for Naval
Analyses. These studies identified several key issues,
including: exclusion of non-DOD costs from the model, the
choice of discount rate, and the limitations of the model when
used for industrial activities. The recommendations of these
studies led to several improvements to the COBRA model,
summarized in Table I.
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Chapter V presented data and analyses of three critical
aspects of the COBRA model: estimating military construction
costs, predicting overhead savings, and the choice of discount
rate. COBRA cost estimates were compared to the actual
military construction costs for three Navy bases for which the
closure process is essentially complete. Overhead costs were
analyzed for several categories of Navy/Marine Corps bases to
determine if the COBRA algorithms correctly estimate overhead
savings. Finally, the discount rate used for COBRA net
present value analysis was evaluated in light of the guidance
provided in OMB Circular A-94.
C. CONCLUSIONS
1. MILITARY CONSTRUCTION COSTS
The COBRA estimates of military construction costs for
the sample Navy bases fall within the expected range for
parametric cost-estimating techniques. However, the small
number of bases in the sample limits the conclusions that can
be drawn regarding the accuracy of the model. Furthermore,
the lack of detailed COBRA estimates for BRAC-I hindered the
analysis of specific construction projects. Future studies
may be able to make more detailed comparisons between COBRA
estimates and actual MILCON costs, since the Navy BSAT
maintains detailed COBRA construction estimates for the bases
involved in the 1991 and 1993 BRAC rounds.
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The COBRA estimates of military construction costs are
highly dependent on the definition of the base closure
scenario. The COBRA model does not estimate the square
footage of facilities that will be required at a receiving
base; the analysts who are developing the scenario-specific
data must estimate the construction requirements outside the
model. COBRA produces cost estimates for these construction
requirements using standard factors determined from historical
construction cost data. The key variables, building or
facility type and square footage, are entered in the model as
part of the scenario-specific data. Thus, COBRA estimates of
construction CJsts can only be as accurate as the construction
requirements defined in the scenario.
Modification of the model to allow entering known
construction costs should improve the COBRA net present value
analyses. Detailed estimates of construction costs are
normally more accurate than parametric cost estimates.
2. OVERHEAD SAVINGS
COBRA mathematical models for non-payroll overhead
costs may not adequately describe overhead costs for all types
of Navy and Marine Corps installations. Regression analyses
of overhead costs for five categories of Navy installations
reveals that the relationships between MRP costs and building
square footage and between OBOS costs and total personnel vary
significantly between categories of installations. Indeed,
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for one category- -naval shipyards- -building square footage and
total personnel are weak predictors of non-payroll overhead
costs.
COBRA applies the same exponential cost models to all
types of bases when estimating overhead savings from base
closures, and this may produce significant errors. As shown
earlier, if the overhead costs for the receiving bases
involved in a particular closure scenario do not behave
according to this single model, then the overhead costs may be
under- or overestimated by significant amounts. For air
stations, which exhibit large economies of scale (as evidenced
by exponent terms that are much less than one), applying the
current COBRA overhead cost model overestimates the increase
in overhead costs at receiving bases. Thus, recurring overhead
savings are underestimated. For hospitals, which exhibit
economies of scale to a much smaller degree (as evidenced by
exponents slightly less than one), applying the COBRA overhead
cost model underestimates the increase in overhead costs at
receiving facilities. In these cases, recurring overhead
savings are overestimated.
Modifying the COBRA overhead cost models to account
for the differences in overhead cost relationships across
categories of installations may reduce the errors in overhead
savings estimates. The regression models for overhead costs
presented in this study may be considered rough first attempts
to describe the overhead cost relationships for five types of
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installations. Regression analyses were limited to single
predictor variables (building square footage for MRP costs and
total personnel for OBOS costs) and two possible functional
forms (linear or logarithmic). Future studies may provide
better cost models based on examination of other functional
forms and predictor variables.
3. CHOICE OF DISCOUNT RATE
Based on careful reading of OMB Circular A-94, the
U.S. Treasury rate appears to be the most appropriate discount
rate for COBRA net present value analyses. Current DOD policy
limits the COBRA model to internal DOD costs and savings;
costs and savings to other government agencies or society as
a whole are excluded. According to A-94, costs and savings
which are internal to the government (or agency) should be
discounted using the government Treasury borrowing rate.
Using the Treasury rate vice the 7 percent real rate
to discount the costs and savings in the COBRA net present
value analysis would have significant consequences. Published
Treasury rates are nominal rates, and must be converted to
real rates (modified for the effects of inflation) if constant
dollars are to be used in the net present value analyses.
Circular A-94 specifies a real interest rate on 30-year
Treasury Bonds of 3.8 percent, significantly lower than 7
percent [Ref. 79]. Using the 3.8 percent discount
rate will increase the net present values of all base closure
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scenarios, since the recurring savings which occur in out-
years will be discounted at a lower rate. For example, using
the 3.8 percent rate increases the 20-year NPV of the closure
of Cecil Field from $200 to $357 million. 1 5
Using the Treasury rate to discount costs and savings
will also affect the comparison of competing base closure
scenarios. One may consider the case where two base closure
alternatives are being evaluated to determine the scenario
that will produce the greatest savings. The timing and dollar
value of the costs and savings streams may be different for
the two alternatives, e.g., one alternative may have higher
costs early in the project life, with higher expected savings
in the later years of the project. Lowering the discount rate
(to more closely approximate the true cost of government
borrowing) will increase the value of the savings streams in
the out-years. The base closure scenario with a larger
portion of its savings occuring in the out-years will become
relatively more attractive.
D. NAVY USE OF COBRA
Normally there are two types of decisions associated with
benefit-cost analysis or capital budgeting--screening
decisions and preference decisions [Ref. 801.
15 The net present values were obtained by performing COBRA
analyses for the closure of Cecil Field using different discount
rates: 7 percent and 3.8 percent.
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Screening involves making decisions based solely on whether a
proposed project (such as a base closure) meets some preset
standard of acceptance. Preference decisions, on the other
hand, are based on the selection of the best course of action
from among several alternatives. In the context of the base
closure process, the financial screening decision verifies
that a particular base closure scenario has a positive net
present value, i.e., pays for itself in savings. Preference
decisions are required when several closure s aarios meet
this screening criterion and the Commission must choose from
among them the best closure alternative.
The Navy Base Structure Analysis Team (BSAT), which
performs the analyses supporting Navy recommendations for base
closures, has used the COBRA model primarily as a screening
tool. During the 1991 and 1993 BRAC, the Navy based its
recommendations to close particular bases primarily on the
need to reduce excess capacity while retaining the highest
military value. Once the bases to be closed were identified
based on these criteria, COBRA analyses were performed to
verify that the decision paid off financially, i.e., had a
positive net present value. According to the BSAT Leader for
Return on Investment and Economic Impact Analysis, "The
primary use of COBRA was to ensure that a closure
recommendation made business sense in terms of return on
investment. The key decision criteria were always reducing
excess capacity and retaining military value." [Ref. 81]
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However, COBRA also has been used as a preference
decision-making tool. During the 1993 BRAC, the Navy
recognized that excess naval aviation depot capacity existed
and determined that three of their six depots should be
closed. The Navy submitted an initial recommendation to close
Naval Aviation Depots in Pensacola, Alameda, and Cherry Point,
and verified that the closures did in fact have positive net
present values. However, the Navy analysis of operational air
stations broughý forth the recommendation to close Cecil
Field, which would move significant Navy/Marine Corps aviation
assets to Cherry Point. Realizing that it may then be
desirable to operate the aviation depot at Cherry Point, the
Navy conducted a second COBRA analysis for a scenario closing
aviation depots at Pensacola, Alameda, and Norfolk. This
scenario provided greater savings than the original
recommendation and so the recommendation was changed to close
the Norfolk depot vice the Cherry Point depot
[Ref. 82]. Later, during the deliberations of the
Commission, the Navy was called upon to produce COBRA analyses
for all possible scenarios for closing three aviation depots.
After evaluating the results of the Navy analyses, the
Commission approved the Navy recommendation to close aviation
depots at Pensacola, Alameda, and Norfolk. [Ref. 83]
Preference decisions are normally more difficult than
screening decisions because they call for choosing the best
base closure scenario (the one with highest net present value)
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from among several alternatives. The evaluation of all the
alternative scenarios for closing three aviation depots
described above involved considerable effort on the part of
the Navy BSAT [Ref. 84]. As DOD budgets decline (in
real terms) and the pressure to save defense dollars by
closing bases continues, the Navy can be expected to evaluate
more closure scenarios from a financial preference
perspective.
When base closure alternatives are compared in order to
determine the scenario that produces the largest savings,
accurate estimation of costs and savings becomes even more
critical. If the alternatives have similar net present
values, then relatively small errors in the calculation of
costs and savings may make an inferior scenario appear more
financially attractive than the superior scenario, leading to
an incorrect decision. Incorrect decisions would waste
precious DOD dollars and expose the Navy and DOD to criticism
regarding the base closure selection process. Thus it would
seem that the accuracy of the COBRA cost-benefit analysis is
critical to the base closure selection process.
This thesis identifies several changes that may be made to
improve the accuracy of the COBRA model. Careful definition
of the construction requirements for each base closure
scenario is the key to producing accurate estimates of
military construction costs. Modifying the COBRA overhead
cost models for the differences between types of installations
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will allow the model to produce better estimates of recurring
overhead savings. Finally, changing the discount rate used in
COBRA to more accurately reflect the government cost ot
borrowing funds'will produce a more accurate picture of the
net present value of base closure alternatives.
E. BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS OF BRAC-II1 DECISIONS
Implementation of the decisions resulting from the 1993
BRAC places considerable pressure on an increasingly lean Navy
budget. As a result of 1993 Commission decisions, the Navy
will close 12 operational bases, 8 major industrial
activities, 4 major technical centers, 5 major personnel
support activities, and 55 reserve centers. The one-time cost
required to close these bases is estimated at $4.1 billion (in
fiscal year 1994 dollars), excluding environmental cleanup
costs [Ref. 85]. By comparison, the net one-time
closure cost for the Navy bases chosen for closure in two
earlier rounds is estimated at approximately $800 million
[Ref. 86].
Congress appropriates funds annually to the BRAC accounts
to pay for these closure costs, but experience with earlier
BRAC rounds indicates that the military departments initial
estimates of closure costs have been low. As a result,
according to GAO, "Congress may have to appropriate more money
to the BRAC accounts than previously estimated."
[Ref. 87] One of the key reasons for this is the
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increase in environmental cleanup costs. Estimates of
environmental cleanup costs have increased significantly as
detailed studies and tests have been conducted. During the
period from fiscal year 1991 to 1993, DOD estimates of
environmental cleanup costs for BRAC-I rose from $510 to $859
million, an increase of 66 percent [Ref. 88].
As noted earlier, environmental cleanup costs are excluded
from the COBRA model since the DOD is required to clean up
bases whether or not they are being closed. Indeed, according
to GAO, environmental restoration costs were not "...a factor
in the DOD base closure decision-making process..."
[Ref. 89]. If estimates of environmental cleanup
costs continue to increase dramatically as they have for the
first two BRAC rounds, the initial estimates of the funds
required in the BRAC accounts obviously will be low. (A 66
percent increase in environmental cleanup costs for the 1993
BRAC would represent a budget shortfall of approximately $500
million.16 ) If the environmental costs turn out to be
substantially higher than initial estimates, DOD may be unable
to complete the 1993 base closures without appropriation or
reallocation of significant additional funds to the BRAC
accounts.
16 Based on the initial DOD estimate of $725 million to
clean up the bases on the 1993 base closure list. Note that DOD
estimates of the cleanup costs for the 1991 round are already $2
billion.
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F. AREAS FOR FER- ERESEARCH
Analysis of the COBRA model suggests the following issues
and research tasks are worthy of further attention:
"* Conduct a detailed study of the overhead cost structure at
Naval installations. Identify the variables that are the
best predictors of Maintenance of Real Property (MRP) and
Other Base Oberating Support (OBOS) costs. Results may be
used to update the COBRA algorithms to more accurately
predict overhead savings from base closures.
"* Assess the base closure decision process from the social
welfare perspective. What social costs and benefits (not
included in the COBRA model) might be considered for
inclusion in the analysis of proposed base closures?
"* Estimate the magnitude of the environmental cleanup
problem for military installations selected for closure.
Will the cost of cleanup continue to rise as it has during
the early rounds of closures?
"* Analyze the specific application of the COBRA model to
industrial activities such as shipyards, aviation depots,
and other repair facilities. Does COBRA allow for the
analysis of all relevant costs and savings? Should the
model be revised to better accommodate these types of
installations?
"* Verify the COBRA standard factors by comparing them with
the results of past base closures. For example, can key
variables such as the percentage of civilians who refuse
to relocate during base closure be predicted accurately?
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APPENDIX A
A. BRAC-I MILCON COST DATA
Military construction costs for the NS Brooklyn, NS Sand
Point, and NS Hunters Point base closures are presented in
Table IV. The source of the data is the Department of the Navy
FY 1994 Budget justification presented to Congress in April
1993. The military construction costs were converted to FY
1989 dollars using the Price Inflation Indices for
Construction prescribed in the Navy Comptroller's guidance for
Navy budget preparation. [Ref. 90]
Table IV MILCON Costs in FY 1989 Dollars (thousands)
Base FY 90 FY 91 FY 92 FY 93 Total
Brook- 19808 12114 0 9283 41205
lyn
Sand 0 27343 0 50742 78085
Point , I I I I
Hunter 54904 5070 6636 4454 71164
Point
Table V presents the COBRA estimates for the MILCON costs
for these base rclosures. The source of the data is the 1988
Commission estimates of implementation costs as presented by
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the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations) to
the Military Installations and Facilities Subcommittee of the
House Armed Services Committee. [Ref. 91] The raw
data are presented in then-year dollars based on the COBRA
model assumption of three percent annual inflation. The data
in Table II have been converted to FY 1989 dollars taking into
account this three percent inflation rate. Al? comparisons of
MILCON costs and estimates presented in this study use
constant FY 1989 dollars.
Table V COBRA Estimates of MILCON Costs in FY 1989
Dollars (thousands)
Base FY 90 FY 91 Beyond Total
Brooklyn 6796 3770 25766 36333
Sand 16505 7541 55086 79132
Point I I _ _
Hunters 40777 39589 0 80366
Point
B. NAVY KILCON STANDARD FACTORS
Table VI presents the Navy's standard factors for military
construction as used in the 1988 and the 1993 COBRA model.
The source of the for the 1988 data is the original
documentation for the COBRA model provided by LMI. The 1993
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standard factors are taken from the Navy COBRA standard factor
data call. [Ref. 92]
Table VI Navy COBRA Standard Factors for MILCON
Category Units 1989 Cost 1993 Cost
factor Factor($/unit) ($/unit)
Runways SY 47 46
Berthing FB 9968 9859
Air Maint. SF 114 112
Operations SF 121 120
Admin. SF 106 105
Training SF 112 110
Maint. SF 95 94
Bachelor SF 72 79
Qtrs.
Family Unit 79000 61900
Housing
Supp1y SF 85 84
Dining SF 157 152
Personnel SF 107 106
Support
CormL ica- SF 173 171
tion
Ship SF 109 108
Maint.
RDT&E SF 147 145
Ammo SF 163 161
Storage




The overhead cost data presented here were obtained during
the Navy Base Structure Analysis Team (BSAT) Data Call Number
Thirty-seven of September 1992. Data Call Thirty-seven
assembled MRP and OBOS cost data from over 200 Navy and Marine
Corps installations in the U.S. and its territiories. The
Navy BSAT used these data to estimate the RPMA Building Index
and BOS Index for Navy facilities. The Indexes were entered
as standard factors in the 1993 COBRA model.
This study used these data to develop overhead cost models
for several categories of Navy installations: air stations,
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APPENDIX C
REGRESSION ANALYSES
The detailed results of the regression analyses are
provided in this appendix. Regression analyses were conducted
using MINITAB statistical software for minicomputers.
The appendix has five sections, one for each of the five
categories of installations examined by this study: naval
hospitals, communication facilities, naval shipyards,
Navy/Marine Corps air stations, and naval stations. Each
section contains a table presenting the overhead cost data for
the sample group, followed by the MINITAB results for the four
regression analyses performed for each sample.
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A. NAVAL HOSPITALS
Table VII NON-PAYROLL OVERHEAD FOR NAVAL HOSPITALS
Installa- Total SF MRP Personnel OBOS
-tion (non- (non-
payroll) payroll)
Bethesda 4133118 16705 4850 23852
Ports- 1273156 2803 3670 9128
mouth, VA
Pensacola 319594 2169 1038 3310
Great 1087559 3955 2226 5604
Lakes
Jackson- 548708 3724 1626 2212
vy1le
San Diego 2034313 6474 4502 11741
Oakland 790742 5201 2158 7803
Beaufort 492416 724 615 1505
Orlando 258737 780 998 1847
Cherry 119873 277 368 397
Point
-Newport 325848 876 565 1934
Camp 491973 320 1172 1804
LeJeune
Camp 487563 2900 1282 2855
Pendleton
Bremerton 287666 1037 888 2664
Guam 375012 5870 544 3588
112
Regression of MRP vs. Square footaQe of facilities
The regression equation is
MRP = 368 + 0.00371 Total SF
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio p
Constant 367.9 590.2 0.62 0.544
Total SF 0.0037076 0.0004467 8.30 0.000
s = 1723 R-sq - 84.1% R-sq(adj) = 82.9%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F p
Regression 1 204462304 204462304 68.90 0.000
Error 13 38580432 2967725
Total 14 243042736
Obs.Total SF MRP Fit Stdev.Fit Residual St.Resid
1 4133118 16705 5692 1525 1013 1.26 X
2 1273156 2803 5088 480 -2285 -1.38
3 319594 2169 1553 508 616 0.37
4 1087559 3955 4400 455 -445 -0.27
5 548708 3724 2402 467 1322 0.80
6 2034313 6474 7910 585 -1436 -0.91
7 790742 5201 3300 446 1901 1.14
8 492416 724 2194 475 -1470 -0.89
9 258737 780 1327 522 -547 -0.33
10 119873 277 812 556 -535 -0.33
11 325848 876 1576 507 -700 -0.43
12 491973 320 2192 476 -1872 -1.13
13 487563 2900 2176 476 724 0.44
14 287666 1037 1434 515 -397 -0.24
15 375012 - 5870 1758 496 4112 2.49R
R denotes an obs. with a large st. resid.
X denotes an obs. whose X value gives it large influence.
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Regression of in MRP vs. in Square footage
The regression equation is
in MRP = - 5.84 + 1.02 in SF
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio p
Constant -5.843 3.101 -1.88 0.082
in SF 1.0155 0.2335 4.35 0.001
s = 0.7790 R-sq = 59.3% R-sq(adj) = 56.1%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F p
Regression 1 11.4'16 11.476 18.91 0.001
Error 13 7.888 0.607
Total 14 19.364
Obs. in SF In MRP Fit Stdev.Fit Residual St.Resid
1 15.2 9.723 9.628 0.505 0.096 0.16 X
2 14.1 7.938 8.432 0.276 -0.493 -0.68
3 12.7 7.682 7.028 0.242 0.654 0.88
4 13.9 .8.283 8.272 0.252 0.011 0.01
5 13.2 8.223 7.577 0.201 0.646 0.86
6 14.5 8.776 8.908 0.359 -0.132 -0.19
7 13.6 8.557 7.948 0.215 0.609 0.81
8 13.1 6.585 7.467 0.204 -0.882 -1.17
9 12.5 6.659 6.814 0.272 -0.154 -0.21
10 11.7 5.624 6.032 0.415 -0.408 -0.62
11 12.7 6.775 7.048 0.239 -0.272 -0.37
12 13.1 5.768 7.466 0.204 -1.698 -2.26R
13 13.1 7.972 7.457 0.204 0.515 0.69
14 12.6 6.944 6.921 0.256 0.023 0.03
15 12.8 8.678 7.190 0.223 1.487 1.99
R denotes an obs. with a large st. x3sid.
X denotes an obs. whose X value gives it large influence.
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Regression of OBOS vs. Total personnel
The regression equation is
OBOS - - 1236 + 3.73 Personel
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio p
Constant -1236 1133 -1.09 0.295
Personel 3.7277 0.5018 7.43 0.000
s = 2735 R-sq = 80.9% R-sq(adj) 79.5%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE D12 SS MS F p
Regression 1 412692896 412692896 55.19 0.000
Error 13 97214328 7478025
Total 14 509907232
Obs. Personel OBOS Fit Stdev.Fit Residual St.Resid
1 4850 23852 16843 1701 7009 3.27R
2 3670 9128 12444 1188 -3316 -1.35
3 1038 3310 2633 795 677 0.26
4 2226 5604 7061 743 -1457 -0.55
5 1626 2212 4825 710 -2613 -0.99
6 4502 11741 15546 1543 -3805 -1.69
7 2158 7803 6808 733 995 0.38
8 615 1505 1056 912 449 0.17
9 998 1847 2484 805 -637 -0.24
10 368 397 135 996 262 0.10
11 565 1934 870 929 1064 0.41
12 1172 1804 3132 767 -1328 -0.51
13 1282 2855 3542 747 -687 -0.26
14 888 2664 2074 832 590 0.23
15 544 3588 791 935 2797 1.09
R denotes an obs. with a large st. resid.
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Regression of in OBOS vs. in Total personnel
The regression -equation is
in OBOS = 0.16 + 1.11 in Pers
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio p
Constant 0.160 1.173 0.14 0.893
in Pers 1.1093 0.1624 6.83 0.000
s - 0.4825 R-sq = 78.2% R-sq(adj) = 76.5%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F p
Regression 1 10.866 10.866 46.67 0.000
Error 13 3.027 0.233
Total 14 13.893
Obs. in Pers in OBOS Fit Stdev.Fit Residual St.Resid
1 8.49 10.080 9.574 0.246 0.505 1.22
2 8.21 9.119 9.265 0.208 -0.146 -0.34
3 6.95 8.105 7.864 0.130 0.241 0.52
4 7.71 8.631 8.710 0.151 -0.079 -0.17
5 7.39 7.702 8.362 0.129 -0.660 -1.42
6 8.41 .9.371 9.492 0.236 -0.121 -0.29
7 7.68 8.962 8.676 0.148 0.286 0.62
8 6.42 7.317 7.283 0.175 0.033 0.07
9 6.91 7.521 7.821 0.132 -0.299 -0.64
10 5.91 5.984 6.714 0.241 -0.730 -1.75
11 6.34 7.567 7.189 0.185 0.378 0.85
12 7.07 7.498 7.999 0.126 -0.501 -1.08
13 7.16 7.957 8.098 0.125 -0.141 -0.30
14 6.79 7.888 7.691 0.140 0.197 0.43
15 6.30 8.185 7.147 0.190 1.038 2.34R
R denotes an obs. with a large st. resid.
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B. COKUNICATION SITES
Table VIII NON-PAYROLL OVERHEAD FOR COMMUNICATION
FACILITIES
Installa Total SF MRP Personnel OBOS
-tion (non- (non-
payroll) payroll)
Puerto 73387 132 251 1542
Rico
Chelten- 207365 316 939 1502
ham, Md
Honolulu 465927 1227 1361 4267
Cutler 155861 819 265 1544
Key West 8496 20 78 202
Guam 527005 1722 1186 8356
Norfolk 380189 795 12j2 4002
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Regression of MRP Costs vs. Sauare footage of facilities
The regression equation is
MRP = - 15 + 0.00283 SF
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio p
Constant -15.2 174.9 -0.09 0.934
SF 0.0028256 0.0005483 5.15 0.004
s = 268.5 R-sq = 84.2% R-sq(adj) = 81.0%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F p
Regression 1 1914913 1914913 26.56 0.004
Error 5 360514 72103
Total 6 2275428
Obs. SF MRP Fit Stdev.Fit Residual St.Resid
1 73387 132 192 144 -60 -0.27
2 207365 316 571 105 -255 -1.03
3 465927 -1227 1301 152 -74 -0.34
4 155861 819 425 116 394 1.63
5 8496 20 9 171 11 0.05
6 527005 1722 1474 178 248 1.24
7 380189 795 1059 121 -264 -1.10
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Regression of in MRP vs in Sguare footage
The regression equation is
in MRP - - 6.47 + 1.04 in SF
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio p
Constant -6.471 1.510 -4.29 0.008
In SF 1.0402 0.1257 8.27 0.000
s - 0.4461 R-sq = 93.2% R-sq(adj) - 91.8%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F p
Regression 1 13.619 13.619 68.45 0.000
Error 5 0.995 0.199
Total 6 14.614
Obs. in SF In MRP Fit Stdev.Fit Residual St.Resid
1 11.2 4.883 5.183 0.192 -0.300 -0.74
2 12.2 5.756 6.263 0.173 -0.507 -1.23
3 13.1 7.112 7.105 0.220 0.007 0.02
4 12.0 6.708 5.966 0.169 0.742 1.80
5 9.0 2.996 2.940 0.400 0.056 0.28
6 13.2 7,451 7.233 0.230 0.218 0.57
7 12.8 6.678 6.894 0.204 -0.215 -0.54
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Regression of OBOS vs. Total Personnel
The regression equation is
OBOS - 228 + 3.72 Personel
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio p
Constant 228 1399 0.16 0.877
Personel 3.717 1.530 2.43 0.059
s = 2045 R-sq - 54.1W R-sq(adj) = 44.91
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F p
Regression 1 24673940 24673940 5.90 0.059
Error 5 20915994 4183199
Total 6 45589936
Obs .Personel OBOS Fit Stdev.Fit Residual St.Resid
1 251 1542 1161 1099 381 0.22
2 939 1502 3718 819 -2216 -1.18
3 1361 4267 5287 1199 -1020 -0.62
4 265 1544 1213 1084 331 0.19
5 78 202 518 1301 -316 -0.20
6 1186 8356 4636 1010 3720 2.09R
7 1252 4002 4882 1077 -880 -0.51
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Regression of in OBOS vs. in Total personnel
The regression equation is
in OBOS - 1.54 + 0.966 in Pers
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio p
Constant 1.536 1.384 1.11 0.318
in Pers 0.9657 0.2186 4.42 0.007
s - 0.5912 R-sq - 79.6% R-sq(adj) - 75.5%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F p
Regression 1 6.8183 6.8183 19.51 0.007
Error 5 1.7475 0.3495
Total 6 8.5658
Obs. in Pers in OBOS Fit Stdev.Fit Residual St.Resid
1 5.53 7.341 6.873 0.274 0.468 0.89
2 6.84 7.315 8.147 0.259 -0.832 -1.57
3 7.22 8.359 8.505 0.308 -0.146 -0.29
4 5.58 7.342 6.925 0.267 0.417 0.79
5 4.36 5.308 5.744 0.470 -0.436 -1.21
6 7.08 9.031 8.372 0.288 0.659 1.28
7 7.13 8.295 8.425 0.296 -0.130 -0.25
121
C. NAVAL SHIPYARDS
Table IX NON-PAYROLL OVERHEAD FOR NAVY SHIPYARDS
Installa Total SF MRP Personnel OBOS
-tion (non- (non-
payroll) payroll)
Ports- 3346573 21618 6557 20045
mouth,NH
Ports- 7668651 26671 11909 79704
mouth,VA
Charles- 3D40972 3350 5884 12804
ton
Mare 8447344 15391 9741 67090
Island
Puget 5145012 13473 18393 57963
Sound
Pearl 3521510 13108 5282 40712
Harbor
Long 2545510 9537 4357 23202
Beach
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Regression of MRP vs. Sauare Footage of Facilities
The regression equation is
MRP - 6125 + 0.00179 SF
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio p
Constant 6125 6377 0.96 0.381
SF 0.001788 0.001205 1.48 0.198
s - 6984 R-sq = 30.6t R-sq(adj) = 16.7t
SOURCE DF SS MS F p
Regression 1 107295864 107295864 2.20 0.198
Error 5 243855456 48771092
Total 6 351151328
Obs. SF MRP Fit Stdev.Fit Residual St.Resid
1 3346573 21618 12108 3179 9510 1.53
2 7668651 26671 19834 4334 6837 1.25
3 3040972 3350 11561 3398 -8211 -1.35
4 8447344 15391 21226 5111 -5835 -1.23
5 5145012 13473 15323 2669 -1850 -0.29
6 3521510 13108 12420 3067 688 0.11
7 2545510 9537 10676 3803 -1139 -0.19
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Regression of in MRP vs. in Square foota•ce
The regression equation is
in MRP - - 2.65 + 0.791 in SF
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio p
Constant -2.651 8.228 -0.32 0.760
in SF 0.7908 0.5379 1.47 0.201
s - 0.6177 R-sq - 30.2% R-sq(adj) - 16.2%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F p
Regression 1 0.8247 0.8247 2.16 0.201
Error 5 1.9077 0.3815
Total 6 2.7323
Obs. in SF in MRP Fit Stdev.Fit Residual St.Resid
1 15.0 9.981 9.230 0.274 0.752 1.36
2 15.9 10.191 9.885 0.382 0.306 0.63
3 14.9 8.117 9.154 0.304 -1.037 -1.93
4 15.9 9.642 9.962 0.425 -0.320 -0.71
5 15.5 9.508 9.570 0.249 -0.061 -0.11
6 15.1 9.481 9.270 0.261 0.211 0.38
7 14.7 9.163 9.013 0.373 0.150 0.30
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Regression of OBOS vs. Total Personnel
The regression equation is
OBOS - 12182 + 3.48 Personel
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio p
Constant 12182 17193 0.71 0.510
Personel 3.481 1.720 2.02 0.099
s - 20937 R-sq = 45.0% R-sq(adj) - 34.0%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F p
Regression 1 1795580928 1795580928 4.10 0.099
Error 5 2191709696 438341952
Total 6 3987290624
Obs.Personel OBOS Fit Stdev.Fit Residual St.Resid
1 557 20045 35006 8861 -14961 -0.79
2 11909 79704 53636 9479 26068 1.40
3 5884 12804 32664 9438 -19860 -1.06
4 9741 67090 46090 8052 21000 1.09
5 18393 57963 76207 18183 -18244 -1.76
6 5282 40712 30568 10040 10144 0.55
7 4357 23202 27348 11090 -4146 -0.23
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Regression of in OBOS vs. In Total Personnel
The regression equation is
in OBOS - 1.97 + 0.949 in Pers
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio p
Constant 1.969 3.877 0.51 0.633
in Pers 0.9491 0.4315 2.20 0.079
s = 0.5397 R-sq - 49.2t R-sq(adj) = 39.01
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F p
Regression 1 1.4091 1.4091 4.84 0.079
Error 5 1.4564 0.2913
Total 6 2.8654
Obs. in Pers in OBOS Fit Stdev.Fit Residual St.Resid
1 8.79 9.906 10.310 0.219 -0.405 -0.82
2 9.39 11.286 10.877 0.271 0.409 0.88
3 8.68 9.458 10.207 0.240 -0.750 -1.55
4 9.18 11.114 10.686 0.223 0.428 0.87
5 9.82 10.968 11.289 0.419 -0.322 -0.94
6 8.57 10.614 10.105 0.267 0.509 1.09
7 8.38 10.052 9.922 0.327 0.130 0.30
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D. NAVY/MARINE CORPS AIR STATIONS
Table X NON-PAYROLL OVERHEAD FOR NAVY/MARINE CORPS AIR
Ingtalla Total SF MRP Personnel OBOS
tion (non- (non-
payroll) payroll)
Cherry 4947655 44886 3040 15733
Point
Wilming- 832804 4623 404 5489
ton
Lemoore 2427989 9084 5707 11909
Meridian 1254670 4652 1308 6539
Yuma 1972375 10645 1116 8654
Fallon 1189892 9127 2114 22998
Whiting 1794476 5030 1373 7237
Guam 780753 3945 2125 7772
El 693133 12421 355 10544
Centro
El Toro 5159249 28980 2356 15123
Bruns- 2471652 6416 3650 8013
wick
Beaufort 1825560 8683 1395 4495
Oceana 2784494 12451 9359 24133
Cecil 2636327 12377 7656 19482
Field 
451
Kings- 1021886 1915 3545 4927
ville
Miramar 3557775 15176 18843 24007
Adak 1507095 8285 2564 9949
Key West 1835675 6176 2710 12447
Dallas 985271 2159 624 4193
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Table XI NAVY/MARINE CORPS AIR (cont.)
Installa Total SF MRP Personnel OBOS
-tion (non- (non-
payroll) payroll)
Corpus 4388772 4610 1792 7965
Christi
Alameda 2884183 4925 18107 12444
San 6132223 15670 31403 35810Diego
Glenview 1066235 8800 510 4981
Kanehoe 3813125 23027 1915 7571
Bay
Barbers 1718012 12428 3838 20794
Point
Whidbey 2775115 10909 9276 20945
Isid.
Memphis 5399409 6944 5247 22816
Jackson- 4407537 15154 7620 24354
rifle
New 987996 3550 538 4076
Orleans
Pensa- 4213423 11298 8136 21141
cola
Norfolk 4219750 16497 9416 23920
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Regression of MRP vs. Square footage of facilities
The regression equation is
MRP - 2424 + 0.00325 SF
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio p
Constant 2424 2516 0.96 0.343
SF 0.0032526 0.0008226 3.95 0.000
s = 7111 R-sq = 35.0% R-sq(adj) = 32.8%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F p
Regression 1 790547968 790547968 15.63 0.000
Error 29 1466456960 50567480
Total 30 2257005056
Obs. SF MRP Fit Stdev.Fit Residual St.Resid
1 4947655 44886 18517 2291 26369 3.92R
2 832804 4623 5133 1957 -510 -0.07
3 2427989 9084 10322 1288 -1238 -0.18
4 1254670 4652 6505 1709 -1853 -0.27
5 1972375 10645 8840 1389 1805 0.26
6 1189892 9127 6295 1745 2832 0.41
7 1794476 5030 8261 1452 -3231 -0.46
8 780753 3945 4964 1989 -1019 -0.15
9 693133 12421 4679 2045 7742 1.14
10 5159249 28980 19205 2438 9775 1.46
11 2471652 6416 10464 1284 -4048 -0.58
12 1825560 8683 8362 1440 321 0.05
13 2784494 12451 11481 1283 970 0.14
14 2636327 12377 10999 1277 1378 0.20
15 1021886 1915 5748 1842 -3833 -0.56
16 3557775 15176 13996 1486 1180 0.17
17 1507095 8285 7326 1579 959 0.14
18 1835675 6176 8395 1437 -2219 -0.32
19 985271 2159 5629 1864 -3470 -0.51
20 4388772 4610 16699 1927 -12089 -1.77
21 2884183 4925 11805 1294 -6880 -0.98
22 6132223 15670 22370 3148 -6700 -1.05 X
23 1066235 8800 5892 1816 2908 0.42
24 3813125 23027 14827 1603 8200 1.18
25 1718012 12428 8012 1483 4416 0.63
26 2775115 10909 1451 1282 -542 -0.08
27 5399409 6944 9986 2608 -13042 -1.97
28 4407537 15154 16760 1938 -1606 -0.23
29 987996 3550 5638 1862 -2088 -0.30
30 4213423 11298 16129 1821 -4831 -0.70
31 4219750 16497 16149 1825 348 0.05
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Regression of In MRP vs. in Square footage
The regression equation is
in MRP - - 0.82 + 0.677 In SF
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio p
Constant -0.818 2.307 -0.35 0.725
in SF 0.6773 0.1579 4.29 0.000
s = 0.5603 R-sq = 38.8% R-sq(adj) = 36.7%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F p
Regression 1 5.7722 5.7722 18.39 0.000
Error 29 9.1037 0.3139
Total 30 14.8758
Obs. In SF In MRP Fit Stlev.Fit Residual St.Resid
1 15.4 10.712 9.622 0.164 1.090 2.04R
2 13.6 8.439 8.415 0.182 0.024 0.05
3 14.7 9.114 9.139 0.102 -0.025 -0.05
4 14.0 .8.445 8.692 0.133 -0.247 -0.45
5 14.5 9.273 8.999 0.102 0.274 0.50
6 14.0 9.119 8.656 0.139 0.463 0.85
7 14.4 8.523 8.935 0.105 -0.411 -0.75
8 13.6 8.280 8.371 0.191 -0.091 -0.17
9 13.4 9.427 8.290 0.207 1.137 2.18R
10 15.5 10.274 9.650 0.169 0.624 1.17
11 14.7 8.767 9.152 0.103 -0.385 -0.70
12 14.4 9.069 8.946 0.104 0.123 0.22
13 14.8 9.430 9.232 0.108 0.197 0.36
14 14.8 9.424 9.195 0.105 0.228 0.42
15 13.8 7.557 8.553 0.156 -0.996 -1.85
16 15.1 9.627 9.398 0.127 0.229 0.42
17 14.2 9.022 8.816 0.116 0.206 0.38
18 14.4 8.728 8.950 0.104 -0.222 -0.40
19 13.8 7.677 8.529 0.161 -0.851 -1.59
20 15.3 8.436 9.540 0.150 -1.104 -2.05R
21 14.9 8.502 9.256 0.110 -0.754 -1.37
22 15.6 9.660 9.767 0.192 -0.107 -0.20
23 13.9 9.083 8.582 0.151 0.500 0.93
24 15.2 10.044 9.445 0.134 0.599 1.10
25 14.4 9.428 8.905 0.107 0.523 0.95
26 14.8 .9.297 9.230 0.108 0.067 0.12
27 15.5 8.846 9.681 0.175 -0.835 -1.57
28 15.3 9.626 9.543 0.150 0.083 0.15
29 13.8 8.175 8.530 0.160 -0.356 -0.66
30 15.3 9.332 9.513 0.145 -0.180 -0.33
31 15.3 9.711 9.514 0.145 0.197 0.36
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Rearession of OBOS vs. Total personnel
The regression equation is
OBOS - 9013 + 0.899 Personel
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio p
Constant 9013 1341 6.72 0.000
Personel 0.8989 0.1568 5.73 0.000
s - 5774 R-sq = 53.1W R-sq(adj) = 51.5%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F p
Regression 1 1096166912 1096166912 32.88 0.000
Error 29 966959040 33343416
Total 30 2063126016
Obs.Personel OBOS Fit Stdev.Fit Residual St.Resid
1 3040 15733 11746 1102 3987 0.70
2 404 5489 9376 1302 -3887 -0.69
3 5707 11909 14143 1038 -2234 -0.39
4 1308 6539 10189 1221 -3650 -0.65
5 1116 8654 10016 1237 -1362 -0.24
6 2114 22998 10913 1159 12085 2.14R
7 1373 7237 10247 1216 -3010 -0.53
8 2125 7772 10923 1159 -3151 -0.56
9 355 10544 9332 1306 1212 0.22
10 2356 15123 11131 1143 3992 0.71
11 3650 8013 12294 1074 -4281 -0.75
12 1395 4495 10267 1214 -5772 -1.02
13 9359 24133 17426 1207 6707 1.19
14 7656 19482 15895 1095 3587 0.63
15 3545 4927 12200 1078 -7273 -1.28
16 18843 Z4007 25951 2346 -1944 -0.37
17 2564 9949 11318 1130 -1369 -0.24
18 2710 12447 11449 1121 998 0.18
19 624 4193 9574 1281 -5381 -0.96
20 1792 7965 10624 1183 -2659 -0.47
21 18107 12444 25289 2243 -12845 -2.41R
22 31403 35810 37241 4203 -1431 -0.36 X
23 510 4981 9472 1292 -4491 -0.80
24 1915 7571 10735 1174 -3164 -0.56
25 3838 20794 12463 1066 8331 1.47
26 9276 20945 17351 1200 3594 0.64
27 5247 22816 13730 1037 9086 1.60
28 7620 24354 15863 1093 8491 1.50
29 538 4076 9497 1289 -5421 -0.96
30 8136 21141 16327 1121 4814 0.85
31 9416 23920 17477 1212 6443 1.14
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Regression of in OBOS vs. In Total personnel
The regression equation is
in OBOS - 5.95 + 0.427 in Pers
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio p
Constant 5.9453 0.5165 11.51 0.000
In Pers 0.42673 0.06403 6.66 0.000
s = 0.4069 R-sq = 60.5% R-sq(adj) = 59.1%
Analysi., of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F p
Regression 1 7.3533 7.3533 44.42 0.000
Error 29 4.8008 0.1655
Total 30 12.1541
Obs. in Pers in OBOS Fit Stdev.Fit Residual St.Resid
1 8.0 9.6635 9.3675 0.0731 0.2960 0.74
2 6.0 8.6105 8.5063 0.1466 0.1042 0.27
3 8.6 9.3850 9.6363 0.0845 -0.2512 0.63
4 7.2 8.7855 9.0076 0.0896 -0.2221 -0.56
5 7.0 9..0658 8.9399 0.0958 0.1259 0.32
6 7.7 10.0432 9.2125 0.0761 0.8307 2.08R
7 7.2 8.8870 9.0283 0.0878 -0.1413 -0.36
8 7.7 8.9583 9.2147 0.0760 -0.2564 -0.64
9 5.9 9.2633 8.4511 0.1538 0.8122 2.16R
10 7.8 9.6240 9.2587 0.0744 0.3653 0.91
11 8.2 8.9888 9.4455 0.0744 -0.4567 -1.14
12 7.2 8.4107 9.0351 0.0873 -0.6244 -1.57
13 9.1 10.0913 9.8473 0.1041 0.2440 0.62
14 8.9 9.8772 9.7616 0.0954 0.1156 0.29
15 8.2 8.5025 9.4331 0.0741 -0.9306 -2.33R
16 9.8 10.0861 10.1460 0.1396 -0.0599 -0.16
17 7.8 9.2052 9.2948 0.0736 -0.0896 -0.22
18 7.9 9.4292 9.3185 0.0733 0.1108 0.28
19 6.4 8.3412 8.6918 0.1232 -0.3506 -0.90
20 7.5 8.9828 9.1420 0.0796 -0.1591 -0.40
21 9.8 9.4290 10.1290 0.1375 -0.7000 -1.83
22 10.4 10.4860 10.3639 0.1684 0.1221 0.33
23 6.2 8.5134 8.6057 0.1338 -0.0923 -0.24
24 7.6 8.9321 9.1703 0.0781 -0.2382 -0.60
25 8.3 9.9424 9.4670 0.0750 0.4755 1.19
26 9.1 9.9497 9.8435 0.1037 0.1061 0.27
27 8.6 10.0352 9.6004 0.0820 0.4348 1.09
28 8.9 10.1005 9.7596 0.0952 0.3408 0.86
29 6.3 8.3129 8.6285 0.1310 -0.3156 -0.82
30 9.0 9.9590 9.7876 0.0979 0.1714 0.43
31 9.2 10.0825 9.8499 0.1044 0.2325 0.59
132
X. NAVAL STATIONS
Table XII NON-PAYROLL OVERHEAD FOR NAVAL STATIONS
Installa Total SF MRP Personnel OBOS
-tion (non- (non-
payroll) payroll)
San 3084514 17984 35935 24776
Diego
Puget 1316031 7144 2067 4343
Sound
Roos. 2867223 15580 2397 27185
Roads
Mayport 1673511 3715 11700 18270
Charles- 1618269 7919 18068 17287
ton
New York 1294967 1751 2032 13932
Guam 1055908 10515 4080 11646
Norfolk 2855073 18157 57128 44400
Pearl 3228488 16839 12832 12182
Harbor
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Regression of MRP vs. Sauare Footage of Facilities
The regression equation is
MRP = 1917 + 0.00615 Total SF
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio p
Constant -1917 3177 -0.60 0.565
Total SF 0.006152 0.001402 4.39 0.003
s - 3481 R-sq = 73.4% R-sq(adj) = 69.5%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F p
Regression 1 233436176 233436176 19.27 0.003
Error 7 84804272 12114896
Total 8 318240448
Obs.Total SF MRP Fit Stdev.Fit Residual St.Resid
1 3084514 17984 17060 1792 924 0.31
2 1316031 7144 6180 1608 964 0.31
3 2867223 15580 15723 1572 -143 -0.05
4 1673511 3715 8379 1312 -4664 -1.45
5 1618269 7919 8039 1350 -120 -0.04
6 1294967 1751 6050 1629 -4299 -1.40
7 1055908 10515 4579 1879 5936 2.03R
8 2855073 18157 15648 1561 2509 0.81
9 3228488 16839 17946 1950 -1107 -0.38
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Regression of in MRP vs. in Sauuare Footage
The regression equation is
in MRP = - 9.42 + 1.28 in SF
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio p
Constant -9.423 7.369 -1.28 0.242
in SF 1.2783 0.5087 2.51 0.040
s = 0.6261 R-sq = 47.4k R-sq(adj) = 39.9k
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F p
Regression 1 2.4756 2.4756 6.32 0.040
Error 7 2.7439 0.3920
Total 8 5.2195
Obs. in SF ln MRP Fit Stdev.Fit Residual St.Resid
1 14.9 9.797 9.678 0.314 0.120 0.22
2 14.1 8.874 8.589 0.288 0.285 0.51
3 14.9 9.654 9.584 0.287 0.070 0.13
4 14.3 8.220 8.896 0.222 -0.676 -1.15
5 14.3 8.977 8.853 0.229 0.124 0.21
6 14.1 7.468 8.568 0.294 -1.100 -1.99
7 13.9 9.261 8.307 0.374 0.953 1.90
8 14.9 9.807 9.579 0.286 0.228 0.41
9 15.0 9L.731 9.736 0.332 -0.004 -0.01
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Regression of OBOS vs. Total Personnel
The regression equation is
OBOS = 11138 + 0.505 Personel
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio p
Constant 11138 3271 3.41 0.011
Personel 0.5045 0.1359 3.71 0.008
s - 7239 R-sq = 66.3% R-sq(adj) = 61.5%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F p
Regression 1 722241856 722241856 13.78 0.008
Error 7 366806496 52400928
Total 8 1089048320
Obs.Personel • OBOS Fit Stdev.Fit Residual St.Resid
1 35935 24776 29268 3603 -4492 -0.72
2 2067 4343 12181 3088 -7838 -1.20
3 2397 27185 12347 3060 14838 2.26R
4 11700 18270 17041 2491 1229 0.18
5 18068 17287 20253 2426 -2966 -0.43
6 2032 13932 12163 3091 1769 0.27
7 4080 11646 13196 2925 -1550 -0.23
8 57128 44400 39960 6057 4440 1.12 X
9 12832 12182 17612 2457 -5430 -0.80
R denotes an obs. with a large st. resid.
X denotes an obs. whose X value gives it large influence.
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Regression of in OBOS vs. in Total Personnel
The regression equation is
In OBOS - 6.74 + 0.327 in Pers
Predictor Coef Stdev t-ratio p
Constant 6.739 1.389 4.85 0.000
in Pers 0.3272 0.1522 2.15 0.069
s = 0.5432 R-sq - 39.8t R-sq(adj) = 31.2W
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F p
Regression 1 1.3637 1.3637 4.62 0.069
Error 7 2.0656 0.2951
Total 8 3.4293
Obs. In Pers in OBOS Fit Stdev.Fit Residual St.Resid
1 10.5 10.118 10.171 0.285 -0.053 -0.12
2 7.6 8.376 9.237 0.281 -0.860 -1.85
3 7.8 10.210 9.285 0.264 0.925 1.95
4 9.4 9.813 9.804 0.188 0.009 0.02
5 9.8 9.758 9.946 0.214 -0.188 -0.38
6 7.6 9.542 9.231 0.283 0.311 0.67
7 8.3 9.363 9.459 0.213 -0.096 -0.19
8 11.0 10.701 10.323 0.342 0.378 0.90
9 9.5 9.408 9.834 0.192 -0.426 -0.84
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